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INTRODUCTION
Statements by Special Prosecutor Angela Corey in her April 2012 press
conference regarding the decision to charge George Zimmerman with
Second Degree Murder raised questions anew about the appropriate
limitations on pretrial publicity by attorneys, particularly prosecutors.1
After George Zimmerman’s acquittal in July 2013, the prosecutors, in turn,
publicly questioned the propriety of publicity from his defense attorneys,
stating: “We . . . did not have media interviews every day like they
did . . . . It was obvious they were trying to influence potential jurors.”2
1. See, e.g., Hillary Cohn Aizenman, Pretrial Publicity in a Post-Trayvon Martin World,
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2012, at 13 (noting that the pretrial publicity associated with the Zimmerman case
may have limited Zimmerman’s access to a fair trial); Monroe H. Freedman & Jennifer Gundlach,
Unethical Pretrial Publicity by Zimmerman (Trayvon Martin) Prosecutor, AALS PROF. RESP. SEC.
NEWSLETTER (The AALS Professional Responsibility Section), Spring 2012, at 28–29.
2. Matt Gutman & Seni Tienabeso, George Zimmerman Prosecutor ‘Prayed’ for Him to
Testify, ABC NEWS (July 15, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-prosecutorprayed testify/story?id=19666346&singlePage=true (quoting prosecutor Bernie De la Rionda).
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Indeed, beginning soon after charges were brought, Zimmerman’s defense
attorneys “launched a website, Facebook page, and Twitter account
devoted to the case.”3
The appropriate scope of First Amendment protection for attorney
pretrial publicity has long fostered debate and divergent viewpoints. For
the media, the United States Supreme Court has recognized robust First
Amendment protection for pretrial press coverage.4 However, in its
fractured Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada opinion, the Court approved as
constitutional the less-protective standard found in Model Rule of
Professional Conduct (MRPC) 3.6, which forbids attorneys from engaging
in publicity that creates “a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding.”5 The Gentile Court, like the Model Rules
drafters and many scholars,6 viewed restrictions on attorney pretrial
publicity as a compromise between competing constitutional mandates:
“the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s
interest in fair trials.”7 Further, the Court emphasized the importance of
creating a rule that was viewpoint neutral and applied equally to attorneys
on opposing sides of a case.8 Importantly, MRPC 3.6 applies to all
categories of lawyers, including defense attorneys, prosecutors, and civil
litigators.9
Prior to Gentile, Professor Monroe H. Freedman and Attorney Janet
Starwood had argued that a compromise was unnecessary because the free
speech rights of defense attorneys aligned with the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial—thus, defense attorneys should have
strong First Amendment rights.10 On the other hand, they argued that
prosecutors generally lacked free speech rights to engage in pretrial
3. Adam Hochberg, George Zimmerman’s Lawyers Hope to Win Trial By Social Media in
Trayvon Martin Case, POYNTER (May 7, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/
making-sense-of-news/172840/george-zimmermans-lawyers-hope-to-win-trial-by-social-media-intrayvon-martin-case/.
4. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565, 570 (1976) (noting that the pretrial
publicity represents a confrontation of constitutional guarantees and that “pretrial publicity, even if
pervasive and concentrated, cannot be regarded as leading automatically and in every kind of
criminal case to unfair trial”).
5. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033, 1057–58 (1991).
6. See infra Section I.B.
7. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075.
8. See id. at 1076.
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2014) (providing that “[a] lawyer who is
participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter” is subject to the rule).
The appropriate scope of First Amendment protection for pretrial publicity by civil litigators—
which involves different representational interests, constitutional mandates, and incentives—will be
addressed in a subsequent paper.
10. See Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression
by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607,
612 (1977).
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publicity.11 Notably, the Gentile Court’s constitutional emphasis on the
equal regulation of defense and prosecutor pretrial publicity undermined
Freedman and Starwood’s approach.12
Even among commentators embracing the idea of a compromise
between free speech and fair trials, the appropriate outcome of that
compromise is anything but obvious.13 Moreover, post-Gentile, Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky forcefully argued that all lawyers should be allowed to
engage in pretrial publicity freely,14 while Professor Peter Margulies has
recently argued for extremely limited First Amendment protection for all
attorneys.15
In the face of such divergent viewpoints, several articles that advocate
new regulations on attorney pretrial publicity simply ignore the First
Amendment, by arguing that proposed regulations would constitute
prudent policy, but declining to address whether they are constitutional.16
This highlights that the First Amendment issue is problematic.17 Under

11. See id. at 617–18 (noting the limitations on prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech); accord
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, 306 n.99 (4th ed. 2010)
(citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
12. In fact, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers acknowledges the appeal
of Freedman and Starwood’s double standard, but states that the “Gentile decision removes the
constitutional basis for such arguments.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 109 reporter’s note (2000).
13. See infra Section I.B.
14. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the
First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 862–67 (1998) (arguing that “lawyer speech must be
subjected to strict scrutiny . . . . because government restrictions [on pretrial publicity] are contentbased limits on political speech”).
15. See Peter Margulies, Advocacy as a Race to the Bottom: Rethinking Limits on Lawyers’
Free Speech, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 319, 324 (2012) (describing his normative “structural signaling”
paradigm for lawyer speech, which holds that courts should limit lawyer speech to protect the
integrity of the legal profession from a theoretical “race to the bottom”).
16. See infra Section I.E.
17. Some commentators argue that, despite MRPC 3.6, prosecutors are still saying too much
that harms criminal defendants. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., “May it Please the Camera, . . . I
Mean the Court”—An Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 116,
123–130 (2004) (explaining that the language of MRPC 3.8(f) and 3.6 “is readily subject to strained
interpretations and skillful manipulation that can enable prosecutors to speak about cases in great
detail and in self-serving ways”); Laurie L. Levenson, Prosecutorial Sound Bites: When Do They
Cross the Line?, 44 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1034–52 (2010) (warning of the perils of prosecutorial
pretrial comments and discussing particular contexts in which criminal defendants may be
prejudiced by prosecutorial comments); Judith L. Maute, “In Pursuit of Justice” in High Profile
Criminal Matters, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1746, 1755–58 (2002) (urging prosecutors and
defense counsel in criminal matters to refrain from all extrajudicial statements about the case and
arguing for lawyers involved in criminal cases not to try those cases in the media). Other
commentators contend that defense attorneys should be saying more to protect their clients’
interests. See Robert Gordon, Successfully Trying Your Case in the Court of Public Opinion, FOR
THE DEFENSE, March 2004 (arguing that the defense attorney should speak publicly on behalf of the
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normal First Amendment doctrines, Chemerinsky is right: MRPC 3.6 and
other attorney pretrial publicity limitations are content-based restrictions
on political speech that impose a prior restraint.18 That equals one thing:
strict scrutiny and free speech for attorney pretrial publicity.19 Yet the
scholarly community and regulators have not rallied around Chemerinsky’s
arguments. In the wake of cases like the Duke Lacrosse prosecution20—
where District Attorney Michael Nifong gave over fifty press interviews
making accusations of race-based gang rape within a week of learning of
the allegations21—regulators are not looking to expand the free speech
rights of prosecutors to the apparent detriment of the lives and liberties of
criminal defendants.
The true source of this free speech quandary extends beyond the
constitutionality of pretrial publicity rules. The fundamental problem is the
lack of a workable First Amendment methodology for examining
restrictions on attorney speech in general. Traditional First Amendment
doctrines fail to properly identify attorney speech that should be protected
or that should be restricted.22 This Article advocates using the access-tojustice theory of the First Amendment, which offers a framework for
examining attorney speech issues by attuning First Amendment protection
to the lawyer’s role in the system of justice.23
This approach alleviates the problem of First Amendment protection for
attorney pretrial publicity. Rather than viewing attorney pretrial publicity
as a compromise between incompatible rights to a fair trial and lawyer free
speech, the lawyer’s speech right is keyed to the lawyer’s role in the justice
system. Such an approach does not eliminate the free speech side of the
client to ensure that “truthful reporting will actually occur, and to counter any effects of a negative
press campaign being waged against the client”).
18. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 862–67.
19. See id. at 862 (arguing that government restrictions on lawyer speech are content-based
limits on political speech and therefore warrant strict scrutiny review).
20. See generally Susan Hanley Duncan, Pretrial Publicity in High Profile Trials: An
Integrated Approach to Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right to Privacy, 34 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 755, 759–764 (2008) (discussing the Duke Lacrosse case to demonstrate the effects of
media coverage in high-profile cases); Levenson, supra note 17, at 1022–23 (discussing how the
prosecutor in the Duke Lacrosse case “crossed the line” between fair and foul advocacy with his
“intemperate remarks” about the case); Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence,
and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337,
1337–41 (2007) (detailing the Duke Lacrosse prosecution, including the pretrial publicity and its
impact on the accused).
21. See Mosteller, supra note 20, at 1349–52.
22. See generally Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney
Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 44–57, 95–100 (2011) (discussing the lack of workable theory
to examine attorney speech restrictions and proposing a new approach, the access-to-justice theory,
under which First Amendment protection for attorney speech is keyed to the attorney's role in the
system of justice of invoking and avoiding government power to protect client life, liberty, and
property).
23. Id. at 61.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 2

1878

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

traditional compromise. In fact, restricting certain pretrial publicity can
frustrate the attorney’s role in protecting a client’s life, liberty, and
property.24
Prior approaches to examining attorney speech rights have failed to
address pretrial publicity in a manner that protects the criminal justice
system and the essential roles of the prosecutor and defense attorney
therein, as discussed in Part I. Yet the access-to-justice theory, as discussed
in Part II, attunes attorney speech rights to the role of the attorney in the
proper and constitutional functioning of the justice system. As discussed in
Part III, the very nature of the criminal justice system imposes vastly
differing obligations and duties on the prosecution and defense and their
respective attorney–client relationships. In Part IV, this Article employs the
access-to-justice theory to determine the appropriate scope of free speech
rights for defense attorneys and prosecutors by examining their respective
roles in the criminal justice system and the effects of pretrial publicity from
each on the integrity of that system.
As revealed through this analysis, what is lost in the traditional
compromise is the protection of both the robust free speech rights of
defense attorneys and the integrity of criminal processes. Contrary to the
Supreme Court’s Gentile decision, such a compromise was unnecessary to
achieve viewpoint neutrality and to recognize the essential, but limited,
First Amendment rights of prosecutors to engage in speech necessary for
the investigation and prosecution of crime and for responding to defenseinitiated publicity. By attuning the speech rights of the attorneys to the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system, both free speech and
criminal justice are safeguarded rather than compromised.
I. PREVIOUS APPROACHES
Scholars and courts have sharply disagreed about how to determine
satisfactorily the appropriate scope of First Amendment protection for
attorney pretrial publicity—particularly in the criminal context where a
defendant’s life or liberty is at stake. The views expressed by the Justices
in the fractured Gentile decision addressing the issue are illustrative of the
wide range of views: from full First Amendment protection to no
protection. Additionally, scholars advocate various other approaches
seeking to find a middle ground between those two extremes.
A. The Supreme Court and Attorney Pretrial Publicity
In February 1988, Dominic Gentile, a criminal defense attorney, held a
press conference in which he asserted both the innocence of his client,
24. See id. at 40–42 (arguing that the lawyer’s role as the securer of a client’s “life, liberty,
and property” requires protection from governmental regulation that would undermine that role).
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Grady Sanders, and the culpability of police officers in the disappearance
of four kilograms of cocaine and approximately $300,000 in traveler’s
checks from a safe-deposit vault used in an undercover police operation at
Western Vault Corporation, a company Sanders owned.25 Prior to charging
Sanders, the police and prosecution engaged in extensive publicity,
“clearing” the police officers with access to the vault, implicating Sanders,
and announcing that other vault renters had lost their money.26 In reaction
to the publicity, customers terminated their rentals with Western Vault,
which went out of business.27 Gentile, upon learning that Sanders would be
indicted, decided “for the first time in his career” to call a press conference
regarding a client he was confident was innocent.28 Gentile told the press:
When this case goes to trial, and as it develops, you’re going
to see that the evidence will prove not only that Grady
Sanders is an innocent person and had nothing to do with any
of the charges that are being leveled against him, but that the
person that was in the most direct position to have stolen the
drugs and the money . . . is Detective Steve Scholl.29
Gentile also asserted that the other alleged “victims” were “known drug
dealers and convicted money launderers.”30 Gentile said he couldn’t
elaborate, but reaffirmed, “I represent an innocent guy. All right?”31
At first blush Gentile’s statements seem over-the-top, and Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and the Nevada Supreme Court characterized them
as “highly inflammatory” in that “they portrayed prospective government
witnesses as drug users and dealers, and as money launderers.”32 Yet six
months later a jury acquitted Sanders, and the government’s witnesses
were shown to be drug users (including Detective Scholl33), drug dealers,
and money launderers.34 Moreover, the foreman of the jury stated that if
the jury had “had a verdict form before them with respect to the guilt of
[Detective] Scholl they would have found the man proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”35 As summarized by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, “[a]t
trial, all material information disseminated during [Gentile’s] press
25. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1039–40, 1059–1060 (1991).
26. Id. at 1040–41 (Kennedy, J.).
27. Id. at 1040; see also id. at 1043 (noting Sanders also lost his lease on Atlantic City
property).
28. Id. at 1042.
29. Id. at 1063 (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 1059 (Kennedy, J., appendix to opinion).
31. Id. at 1064 (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at 1079 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1047 (Kennedy, J., opinion of the court) (noting, however, that Detective Scholl
testified that he ingested drugs “to gain the confidence of suspects”).
34. Id. at 1041 (Kennedy, J.), 1047–48 (Kennedy, J., opinion of the court).
35. Id. at 1048 (Kennedy, J., opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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conference was admitted in evidence before the jury,”36 and the jury
apparently found it credible.
The Nevada State Bar disciplined Gentile for violating the Nevada
Supreme Court Rule governing pretrial publicity, which was almost
identical to MRPC 3.6.37 The U. S. Supreme Court reversed the discipline
five to four in fractured opinions that found part of Nevada’s rule
unconstitutionally vague. Justice Kennedy, for four justices, advocated full
First Amendment protection for attorney pretrial publicity to the same
extent as the press.38 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in striking contrast and also
for four justices, appeared to want no First Amendment protection for
attorney pretrial publicity.39
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor provided the fifth vote, joining part of
each opinion.40 It is important to note that Chief Justice Rehnquist
modified his argument that lawyers lack First Amendment rights in the
portion of his opinion joined by Justice O’Connor. Thus, a majority of the
Court adopted a middle position holding that “speech of lawyers
representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less
demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press” under
normal First Amendment doctrines.41 The Court upheld the “substantial
likelihood of material prejudice standard” from MRPC 3.6 as “a
constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights
of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in fair trials.”42 In
explaining why the standard was constitutional, the Court said:
The regulation of attorneys’ speech is limited—it applies only
to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially
prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points of view, applying
equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it
merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the
trial.43
Thus, according to the majority, for the rule to be constitutional it had
to apply equally to defense attorneys and to prosecutors, which this Article
refers to throughout as Gentile’s equality principle.
36. Id. at 1047.
37. Id. at 1033 (Kennedy, J.).
38. See id. at 1054–56 (Kennedy, J.) (“At the very least, our cases recognize that disciplinary
rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment, and
that First Amendment protection survives even when the attorney violates a disciplinary rule he
swore to obey when admitted to the practice of law.” (emphasis added)).
39. See id. at 1081 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Gentile, upon being admitted to
the practice of law, affirmatively recited an oath to abide by the Nevada rules of professional
conduct, and arguing that “[t]he First Amendment does not excuse him from that obligation, nor
should it forbid the discipline imposed upon him by the Supreme Court of Nevada”).
40. Id. at 1032.
41. Id. at 1074 (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion of the court).
42. Id. at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added).
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Justice Kennedy, for four Justices, additionally emphasized the special
concerns created by limiting the speech of defense attorneys, like Gentile,
who have “the professional mission to challenge actions of the State.”44
Kennedy asserted that defense attorneys should be allowed to “take
reasonable steps to defend a client’s reputation” and pursue lawful
strategies to mitigate the charges against clients, including “attempt[ing] to
demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve
to be tried.”45
B. The Compromise Between Fair Trials and the First
Amendment
The major approach to the problem of First Amendment protection for
pretrial publicity—which the Gentile Court accepted—is to view
restrictions on attorney pretrial publicity as a “compromise” between “a
lawyer’s First Amendment right to free speech and a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial.”46 This compromise does not lead to an
obvious or consistent outcome.
1. The Model Rules and the ABA
MRPC 3.6 reflects this compromise and has three basic components:
(1) the general standard forbidding the lawyer from engaging in pretrial
publicity that “will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding in the matter”;47 (2) a safe harbor listing items a
lawyer is allowed to say despite the general standard;48 and (3) a provision
allowing a lawyer to respond to unduly prejudicial publicity “not initiated
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1051 (Kennedy, J.); see also id. at 1055–56.
Id. at 1043.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 90 (footnote omitted).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2014).
See id. at R. 3.6(b). The subsection provides:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state: (1) the claim, offense or
defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons
involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of
a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a
request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6)
a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is
reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an
individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to
subparagraphs (1) through (6): (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family
status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information
necessary to aid in apprehension of that person; (iii) the fact, time and place of
arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and
the length of the investigation.

Id.
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by the lawyer” or her client.49 The comments also include a list of “subjects
that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a
proceeding” and thus presumptively violate the standard.50 In a number of
states, this list of presumptively prejudicial items is part of the rule
proper.51
MRPC 3.6 proclaims its origin from the compromise “between
protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free
expression.”52 The ABA’s Prosecution Function & Defense Function
Standards adopt the same justification—but with one important difference.
In listing the values underlying the compromise, the Standards recognize
that “[a]n accused may never be more in need of the First Amendment
right of freedom of speech than when officially labeled a wrongdoer by
indictment . . . before family, friends, neighbors, and business
associates.”53 This recognition of the accused’s potential right to speak in
the face of official accusations of wrongdoing is not found in the Model
Rules, which seem to strike the balance in favor of the prosecution stating,
49. See id. at R. 3.6(c).
50. See id. at R. 3.6 cmt. [5]. The subjects “that are more likely than not to have a material
prejudicial effect on a proceeding” are:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a
criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected
testimony of a party or witness; (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could
result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the
existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a
defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement; (3) the
performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a
person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical
evidence expected to be presented; (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of
a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in
incarceration; (5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a
substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or (6) the fact that a defendant
has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement
explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is
presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.
Id.(emphasis added).
51. See ABA, Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_3_
6.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited May 24, 2014) (showing state rules containing the list of
presumptively prejudicial statements, including Alabama, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New York, Texas, and West Virginia).
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [1] (emphasis added).
53. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 4-1.4 cmt., at 130 (3d ed. 1993), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf.
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“[t]he public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures
aimed at assuring its security.”54
In addition to Rule 3.6, MRPC 3.8(f) applies specifically to prosecutors
and requires that prosecutors “refrain from making extrajudicial comments
that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of
the accused.”55 Although facially seeming to impose a more stringent
standard on prosecutors, the comments explain that Rule 3.8 is not
“intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor” is expressly
allowed to make under Rule 3.6.56 The Annotated Model Rules do not
appear to treat MRPC 3.8 as imposing a higher standard for prosecutors.57
2. Applying In-Court Restrictions to Extrajudicial Speech
Professor Lonnie Brown embraces the current compromise and the
standard of MRPC 3.6, but notes that problematic publicity persists. Thus,
Brown argues that an appropriate solution is to treat attorney statements to
the press as if filed in court.58 His proposal would require attorneys to file
transcripts of any statements made to the press, and then subject such
statements to the same regulations as in-court speech.59 Brown argues that
his “proposal’s incursion on purported First Amendment rights
is . . . slight.”60 But an objective review of the proposal indicates otherwise.
Courtroom speech, as Professor Frederick Schauer aptly described, is
subject to an “omnipresence” of regulation.61 Brown justifies the
constitutionality of his proposal by citing to Gentile for the proposition that
lawyer speech can “be regulated under a less demanding standard” than
restrictions on the press.62

54.
55.
56.
57.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [1].
Id. at R. 3.8(f).
Id. at R. 3.8 cmt. [5].
See ELLEN J. BENNETT et al., CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.8 annot. (7th ed. 2011) (“Subsection (f) prohibits a prosecutor
from making extrajudicial comments that ‘have a substantial likelihood of heightening public
condemnation of the accused,’ except for certain ‘legitimate’ statements necessary to inform the
public of the proceedings.” (emphasis added)).
58. See Brown, supra note 17, at 138 (arguing that the court of public opinion should be
viewed as a decision-making courtroom and lawyers should be subject to the rules applicable to
courtroom speech in order to create necessary accountability for extrajudicial statements).
59. Id. at 138–39.
60. Id. at 145.
61. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and The Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 691
(1997) (noting the omnipresence of speech regulation in law, specifically using the examples of
securities regulation and the rules of evidence, an omnipresence that Schauer describes as
“unencumbered by either the doctrine or the discourse of the First Amendment”).
62. Brown, supra note 17, at 143 (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074
(1991)).
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3. Freedman and Starwood’s Non-Compromise
Professor Monroe Freedman and Janet Starwood operate on the premise
that while the Constitution guarantees an accused a fair trial by an
impartial jury, it does not guarantee the State “[a] judicial process
untainted by prejudice against the prosecution.”63 Thus, for a criminal
defense attorney, the traditional interests being compromised are aligned:
the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the defendant
and defense attorney have free speech rights. For defense attorneys and
their clients, there is no need to compromise.64 On the other hand,
Freedman and Starwood argue that prosecutors, in light of their
government role, “may be forbidden to publish out-of-court attacks that
might violate a defendant’s fifth and sixth amendment rights to due
process.”65
In a more recent publication, Professor Monroe Freedman and Professor
Abbe Smith have succinctly argued that “[p]rosecutors who make
statements pursuant to their official duties are not protected by the First
Amendment,” under the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision, Garcetti v.
Ceballos.66 Thus, Freedman’s “non-compromise” is complete. There is no
compromise between a defendant’s right to fair trial and her attorney’s
right to free speech; there is also no compromise between a prosecutor’s
lack of First Amendment rights and his obligation to protect the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Nevertheless, the Gentile Court’s constitutional emphasis on equal
regulation of criminal defense and prosecutor pretrial publicity has
undermined acceptance of Freedman and Starwood’s approach. The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement)
acknowledges the appeal of Freedman and Starwood’s double standard, but
states that the “Gentile decision removes the constitutional basis for such
arguments.”67
C. The First Amendment Strongly Protects Attorney
Pretrial Publicity
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has forcefully argued that the First
Amendment should protect attorney pretrial publicity. Applying normal
First Amendment analyses, Chemerinsky argues that strict scrutiny is
required for what is clearly a content-based restriction on political
63. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 612.
64. Id. at 618.
65. Id. at 617.
66. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 11, at 306 n.99 (emphasis added) (citing Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 109 reporter’s note
(2000).
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speech.68 Chemerinsky then argues that MRPC 3.6 does not pass strict
scrutiny—even though ensuring fair trials is a compelling state interest—
because restricting attorney speech is “not necessary to obtain a fair
trial.”69 Chemerinsky argues there is insufficient evidence showing that
juries are prejudiced by attorney publicity,70 and even assuming publicity
prejudices juries, there are less restrictive alternatives to preserve a fair
trial.71 These alternatives include searching voir dire, change of venue,
postponing trial, clear instructions to juries about what can be considered,
and sequestration of the jury.72
Chemerinsky recommends, as a constitutional limitation on pretrial
publicity, the actual malice standard adopted by the Supreme Court for
defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan.73 As with defamation,
Chemerinsky argues that violations must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence,74 the regulating body must prove the attorney’s
statements were in fact false,75 and the attorney must have a “subjective
awareness of probable falsity.”76 Under such a standard, nearly all pretrial
publicity from the prosecution and defense is constitutionally protected.
In a similar vein, Judge (then Professor) Scott Matheson has argued that
prosecutors should have strong free speech rights to engage in pretrial
publicity, and “should not be subject to regulation unless it poses a serious
and imminent threat of prejudice to a judicial proceeding.” 77 Although
Matheson proffers a multifactor test, the ultimate outcome generally
protects prosecutor pretrial publicity, giving prosecutors “more latitude
than many,” including Matheson, “think is wise or prudent.”78
D. Structural Signaling
Professor Peter Margulies recently posited that First Amendment
protection for lawyers should (and constitutionally can) be limited when
the regulated speech would otherwise lead to what Margulies terms a
“signaling spiral”79—“a race to the bottom”80—that threatens “the integrity
68. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 863–67.
69. Id. at 881.
70. Id. at 881–83.
71. See id. at 883.
72. Id.
73. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (setting forth the actual malice standard); Chemerinsky,
supra note 14, at 885.
74. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 885–86.
75. Id. at 886.
76. Id.
77. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 865, 931 (1990).
78. Id. at 932–33.
79. See Margulies, supra note 15, at 324, 377.
80. Id. at 324–25.
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and utility of adjudication.”81 Margulies uses attorney pretrial publicity as
one of his prime examples of problematic signaling spirals.82 Margulies
argues that without limits on pretrial publicity “each side would try its case
in the media”—“[p]rosecutors would practice character assassination on
defendants, and defense counsel would reply in kind, triggering a spiral
that made the actual trial an afterthought.”83 Margulies maintains that
without judicial regulation of pretrial publicity, “[t]here is no natural break
to this process,” and further suggests that alternative remedies, such as voir
dire, would be inadequate to prevent or cure prejudice.84
E. Ignoring the First Amendment Problem
A number of scholars ignore possible First Amendment limitations and
focus solely on what would be prudent guidelines for attorneys to follow,
absent considerations of constitutionality. Professor Gerald Uelmen
addresses solely “the ethical dimensions of trial publicity” because “the
fact that we have a right to do something does not mean it is the right thing
to do.”85 Similarly, Professor Judith L. Maute “urges all persons involved
with either prosecution or defense of criminal matters steadfastly to refrain
from all, or practically all, extrajudicial communications” but notes that
whether such restraints “can withstand First Amendment challenge is
beyond the scope of [her] essay.”86 Finally, Professors Kevin Cole and
Fred Zacharias discuss “the propriety of lawyer statements to the press”
apart from the constitutionality of restrictions thereon.87
In a related vein, scholars have argued for more stringent restrictions on
pretrial publicity, resolving any First Amendment concerns with a cite to
Gentile without seriously examining whether it would be constitutional to
adopt their proposed regime. For example, Professor Laurie Levenson
simply asserts that “First Amendment rights are not absolute”88 and
mentions Gentile.89 Levenson argues that states should model their
professional conduct rules on the prohibitions on Department of Justice
employee pretrial publicity found in the Code of Federal Regulations

81. Id. at 349.
82. See id. at 347.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks, Gags and Shields: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 943, 943 (1997).
86. Maute, supra note 17, at 1746.
87. Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1629–30 (1996).
88. Levenson, supra note 17, at 1027 & n.22 (citing scholarship for proposition that lawyer
speech can be regulated based on Gentile principles).
89. Id. at 1029–30.
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(CFR),90 which are far more restrictive than Gentile’s standard and are not
equally imposed on the defense.91
Similarly, the Restatement adopts “substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing a juror” as the standard for all lawyers, but adds an additional
standard forbidding prosecutors from “making extrajudicial comments that
have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused.”92 The Restatement justifies these “heightened limitations on
extrajudicial comment” by positing that prosecutors “have significantly
diminished free-expression rights to comment publicly on matters in which
they are officially involved as advocates” and thus “prohibitions . . . can be
more extensive” than for other attorneys.93 The Reporter’s Note to the
Restatement, citing solely pre-Gentile caselaw,94 does not explain the
constitutional theory justifying this deviation from the equality principle of
Gentile. Indeed, the Reporter’s Note rejects Freedman and Starwood’s
double standard precisely because of Gentile’s equality principle.95
II. THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Normal First Amendment doctrines are ineffective in the context of
regulating attorney speech. They fail to protect attorney speech that is
essential to the attorney’s role in the justice system, and they also fail to
identify what attorney speech restrictions are necessary for the proper
functioning of the attorney in the justice system.96 Pretrial publicity is no
exception to this problem. Just as the Supreme Court has adopted a rolespecific method for examining speech rights of public employees,97 a

90. See id. at 1026–27 (“States should model their own rules after the Code of Federal
Regulations.”); see also 28 C.F.R § 50.2 (2011).
91. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (b)(3) (establishing limitations on pretrial disclosures in criminal
cases); id. § 50.2(b)(6)(v) (providing that personnel from the Department of Justice should refrain
from making statements regarding evidence or argument available, “whether or not it is anticipated
that such evidence or argument will be used at trial”).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 109 (2000).
93. Id. § 109 cmt. e. (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 109 reporter’s note, cmt. e. The citations for comment (e) are to a state case and two
federal circuit cases that pre-date the 1991 Gentile decision. Id. (citing Henslee v. United States,
246 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Simon, 664 F. Supp. 780, 795–96 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); In re Lasswell, 673 P.2d 855, 858 (Or. 1983)).
95. See id. § 109 reporter’s note (stating that the Gentile Court’s approval of the substantial
likelihood standard removes the constitutional basis for those who argue that the bar against pretrial
publicity should apply only to prosecutors).
96. See Tarkington, supra note 22, at 52–54 (discussing the flaws in the application of normal
First Amendment doctrines to the context of attorney speech).
97. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (rejecting the view that
public employees may be constitutionally compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights, the
Court noted nonetheless that the State has “interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of speech

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 2

1888

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

specialized method is necessary to properly protect and restrict attorney
speech.
The access-to-justice theory that this Article advocates attunes attorney
speech protection to the essential functions of the attorney in the justice
system.98 This approach is grounded in established free speech theories and
philosophy. Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein posited that speech itself can
only be understood as part of the “form of life” in which it exists.99 Thus,
viewing the justice system as a desirable “form of life,” attorney speech
must be understood as part of, and as securing, the proper and
constitutional functioning of the justice system.
More specifically, the access-to-justice theory is modeled on a
democratic theory of the First Amendment, as initially propounded by
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn.100 Just as citizen free speech is essential
to the proper functioning of a democratic government,101 so too, under the
access-to-justice theory, certain species of attorney speech are essential to
the proper functioning of the justice system and must be protected
accordingly.102
Attorneys—through their speech—play a key role in our justice system.
They provide clients with speech that has the force of law, speech
necessary for effective access to the judiciary, and speech intended to
invoke or avoid the power of government in securing life, liberty, or
property. The access-to-justice theory proposes that where attorney speech
is key to providing or ensuring access to justice or the fair administration
of the laws, it is entitled to protection under the Free Speech Clause.103
In developing the access-to-justice theory, I began by identifying those
areas of speech at the core of the attorney’s role in our justice system, areas
that therefore require First Amendment protection.104 Moreover, where the
of the citizenry in general” and thus created a standard specific for analyzing cases involving the
speech rights of public employees).
98. See generally Tarkington, supra note 22, 58–94 (setting forth the access-to-justice theory
for evaluating restrictions on attorney speech).
99. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 11 (trans. G.E.M. Anscombe,
1953) (emphasis omitted) (“[T]he speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”);
accord Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 547 (1988) (arguing that advantages of
formalist interpretations of language depend on the domains in which they are used).
100. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT, 22–27 (1948) (using traditional American town meetings to illustrate and answer the
difficulties of the paradox of freedom as it is applied to speech).
101. See id. at 26–27.
102. Tarkington, supra note 22, at 61–63.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 62–63. The areas identified for core protection include: (1) attorney speech that
invokes law and legal protection; (2) attorney advice regarding the lawfulness or unlawfulness of
proposed or past client conduct; (3) attorney speech necessary to access courts and raise relevant
and colorable legal arguments in adjudicative proceedings; and (4) attorney speech necessary to
preserve the constitutional rights of individuals. Such speech is essential to the role of the lawyer in

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/2

16

Tarkington: Lost in Compromise: Free Speech, Criminal Justice, and Attorney P

2014]

LOST IN THE COMPROMISE

1889

role of the attorney includes challenging and checking government power,
the access-to-justice theory protects the attorney’s speech in making such a
challenge. This “checking value” of the attorney in our system of justice is
a primary justification for protecting certain types of attorney speech and it
resonates with the core purposes underlying the First Amendment as
expounded by Professor Vincent Blasi.105
Nevertheless, there are also restrictions on attorney speech that are
essential to preserve the integrity of our justice system. Alexander
Meiklejohn uses the town meeting as an example of his democratic
theory.106 Although political speech is absolutely protected in town
meetings, it is and must be abridged in some ways—for example, through
rules and regulations about who speaks and when they speak on order by
the chair, etc.107 The abridgment is necessary to accomplish the
governmental purpose in holding the town meeting.108 While manipulation
of the process cannot be allowed—for example, through abridging just one
side of an issue—abridgment through creating rules of the game is
essential to preserve the process itself.109
In like manner, certain restrictions on attorney speech are essential to
preserve the judicial process and overall justice system in which attorneys
work. Thus, the corresponding point of the access-to-justice theory is that
there should not be protection for attorney speech that frustrates or
undermines the justice system—regardless of whether citizens would enjoy
protection for the same speech. For example, under the access-to-justice
theory, it is constitutional for states to forbid attorneys from referring to
inadmissible evidence during a trial.110 Similarly, states can prevent
attorneys from using government power—in the form of law invocation or
legal advice—to perpetrate crimes or frauds.111 It is immaterial that other

our system of justice and should be afforded core protection and subjected to strict scrutiny, similar
to political speech. Id.
105. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (arguing that the “checking value”—“the value that free speech . . . can serve in
checking the abuse of power by public officials”—was a primary purpose underlying the First
Amendment).
106. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 100, at 22–27.
107. See id. at 23–26.
108. Id. at 23 (“The town meeting, as it seeks for freedom of public discussion of public
problems, would be wholly ineffectual unless speech were thus abridged.”).
109. See id. at 23–27 (arguing that citizens may not be barred from exercising their freedom of
speech at town hall meetings “because their views are thought to be false or dangerous,” but those
same citizens may have their speech limited by rules and procedures necessary to engage in
practical self-governance—the purpose for holding the town hall meeting—).
110. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2014) (barring attorneys from
alluding “to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be
supported by admissible evidence” in trial).
111. See id. at R. 1.2(d).
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citizens enjoy free speech rights under Brandenburg v. Ohio112 to advocate
even the most unlawful actions. Because of their role in the system of
justice and their tie to government power, attorneys do not have such a
right when assisting and advising clients.113
Of course, in between these two extremes there are likely categories of
attorney speech that are neither essential to the proper functioning of the
justice system nor frustrating to that system. In such instances, the normal
doctrines of the First Amendment may provide the appropriate framework.
But where attorney speech is tied to government power and affects the
workings of the justice system, the scope of appropriate protection and
restriction under the First Amendment must be attuned to the attorney’s
role in the justice system.
The problem of First Amendment protection for attorney pretrial
publicity is alleviated by this approach. Under the access-to-justice theory,
rather than viewing free speech aspects of pretrial publicity as a
compromise between incompatible constitutional rights to a fair trial and
lawyer free speech, the lawyer’s free speech right is itself defined by the
lawyer’s role in and the proper functioning of the justice system. Thus, the
appropriate scope of free speech protection for attorney pretrial publicity is
determined by examining the respective roles of the prosecutor and defense
attorney in the criminal justice system and the effects of pretrial publicity
by each on the proper functioning of that system.
It is important to emphasize what the existence and absence of a First
Amendment right means. If there is a First Amendment right to engage in
pretrial publicity, then government regulators (such as a state bar or the
federal government in the CFR) cannot limit pretrial publicity except in
compliance with that right. If there is not a First Amendment right to
engage in pretrial publicity then governmental entities are able to regulate
and restrict attorney pretrial publicity, but they are not required to restrict
such publicity.
III. REPRESENTATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
There are several factors that make representation in the criminal justice
system different from lawyer representation in other contexts. In
determining the appropriate scope of First Amendment protection for
pretrial publicity in the criminal justice system, it is important to recognize
112. See Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the constitution forbids
states from prohibiting speech that advocates violating laws or using force “except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action” (emphasis added)).
113. Tarkington, supra note 22, at 83–84 (discussing why the Brandenburg standard should be
inapplicable to attorney legal advice and arguing that attorneys constitutionally can be forbidden
from using “government power—in the form of law or legal advice—to perpetrate crimes or frauds”
even if their speech would not incite imminent lawless or violent action)).
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these differences and how they produce differing obligations, incentives,
and duties for the prosecution and the defense. Those incentives and
obligations affect the willingness of attorneys to engage in pretrial
publicity, the harm to the accused, and the public’s perception of that
publicity.
A. Heightened Constitutional Significance of Life and Liberty
As Professor Geoffrey Hazard has argued, “the legal profession’s
traditional ideal viewed the lawyer as the protector of life, liberty, and
property through due process.”114 Under the access-to-justice theory, the
role of the lawyer in protecting life, liberty, and property is not merely a
means for understanding a lawyer’s professional responsibilities; rather, it
is a key for properly shaping attorney-speech protection.
In considering attorney speech in the criminal justice system, it is
important to recognize that the Constitution affords greater protection to
life and to liberty than it does to property. As noted by Justice Wiley B.
Rutledge in his Bowles v. Willingham concurrence, civil proceedings
generally involve “rights of property, not of personal liberty or life as in
criminal proceedings.”115 While deprivations of property are “serious,”
Justice Rutledge argues they “are not of the same moment under our
system” of justice as criminal deprivations of life and liberty.116 This
divergence is apparent from the fact that the Constitution itself expressly
mandates specific procedural protections for criminal deprivations, which
are simply not applicable in the civil context.117 Justice Rutledge
acknowledges such procedural differences and concludes: “It is in this
respect perhaps that our basic law, following the common law, most clearly
places the rights to life and to liberty above those of property.”118
Additionally, the Suspension Clause119—forbidding Congress from
suspending the writ of habeas corpus absent rebellion or invasion—
underscores the Founder’s preferential protection for life and liberty and
for freedom from unlawful restraint or incarceration.120
The use of state power and processes by attorneys in the criminal justice
system to either secure or deprive individuals of life and liberty is therefore
a particularly weighty concern. Recognizing the constitutional weight
afforded to governmental deprivations of life and liberty foreshadows that
114. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1266 (1991);
accord FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 11, at 15–16.
115. 321 U.S. 503, 521–29 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 525.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
120. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008) (“The Framers viewed freedom from
unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus
as a vital instrument to secure that freedom.”).
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speech essential to securing life and liberty may call for greater protection,
while speech that may undermine individuals’ rights to life and liberty may
be subject to greater restriction.
B. Obligations to Undertake and Continue the Representation
One primary and publicly recognized difference between the
prosecution and the defense is that the prosecution is only supposed to
bring charges and pursue them through trial if they are supported by
probable cause.121 Thus, if evidence does not support bringing charges
against the accused, the prosecution should drop the charges.
Consequently, the very existence of charges against an individual is a
public statement that the prosecutor has obtained sufficient evidence of
guilt to create probable cause to charge that person. The fact that the
prosecutor is undertaking or continuing the representation against the
accused indicates to the public the prosecutor’s belief, at some level, in the
validity of the cause and the likely guilt of the defendant.
Yet, the fact of representation by the criminal defense attorney carries
no such weight or implication. Criminal defendants have a constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel.122 The public understands (and
rightly so) that even the most culpable criminal defendants guilty of the
most heinous crimes are provided an attorney. Because the availability of
representation for the defendant is constitutionally required, the public may
seriously doubt that the defense attorney believes in her client’s cause—
indeed, for all the public knows, the defense attorney may even know her
client is guilty. Thus, the defense attorney may need to publicly indicate
some level of belief in her client’s cause because the simple fact of
representation will not imply it.
C. Duty Not to Disclose Information Relating to the
Representation
It is “[a] fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship [] that,
in the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal
information relating to the representation.”123 Outside of extremely limited
exceptions, attorneys are forbidden from disclosing information learned in
the course of a representation to the press or others,124 unless the client
gives informed consent to the disclosure or the attorney is impliedly
121. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2014) (“The prosecutor in a
criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported
by probable cause . . . .”).
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (“The
right of one charged with a crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair
trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”).
123. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2] (2014).
124. See id. at R. 1.6.
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authorized to make the disclosure for the representation.125 The
professional duty of confidentiality is very broad.126 And lawyers do not
obtain a First Amendment right to disclose client information just because
it involves information that is political, of public concern, involves public
figures, or because of the corresponding right of the press or the public to
receive such information. The duty of confidentiality specifically silences
the attorney, but not others who may have the same information.127
Attorneys have not generally challenged confidentiality requirements under
the First Amendment.128 Rather, attorneys generally understand that
confidentiality requirements are essential to their role in the system of
justice for obtaining full information from the client and using that
information to invoke or avoid government power on behalf of the
client.129 However, it would frustrate the system of justice, and undermine
client disclosure and trust, for an attorney to instead publicize such
information to the embarrassment and detriment of the client. The client
provides information to the attorney for the express purpose that the
attorney, endowed with a law license from the state, will be able to use the
information to invoke or avoid government power on the client’s behalf.
As an essential component of the role of the lawyer in the justice system,
states can constitutionally prohibit attorneys from disclosing confidential
information, absent client consent, outside of what is necessary for the
attorney to fulfill that role.
Thus, before disclosing information to the press, the criminal defense
attorney should communicate to the client her desire to publicize
information relating to the representation and receive the client’s consent
to the disclosure.130 There may be some situations in which the defense
125. Id. at R. 1.6(a); see also id. at R. 1.6 cmt. [5] (explaining that “a lawyer is impliedly
authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation”).
126. See id. at R. 1.6(a) (stating that generally, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to the representation of a client”); id. at cmt. 3 (explaining that the attorney’s duty of confidentiality
“applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source”).
127. See id. at R. 1.6 cmt. [1] (“This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information
relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer’s representation of the client.” (emphasis
added)).
128. However, in a recent case, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that it would violate an
attorney’s First Amendment rights for the State to discipline him under Rule 1.6 for blogging about
embarrassing information regarding clients in concluded cases, where the information had been
contained in public court proceedings. See Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611, 620 (Va.
2013). Under the access-to-justice theory, the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision is incorrect. There
are many restrictions on attorney speech that are essential to the proper functioning of the attorney’s
role in the system of justice, and, for the reasons noted in the text, confidentiality is one of them.
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2] (noting that the duty of
confidentiality is the “hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship” and that it encourages frank and
full communication between lawyer and client).
130. See id. at R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
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attorney’s public statements are impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation.131 Ideally, and when feasible, a defense attorney will
communicate with the accused and receive consent even in such
situations.132
Prosecutors, in contrast, do not represent individual clients, but instead
represent the sovereign.133 In that role, the prosecution acts as agent and
principal.134 Yet, prosecutors obtain information about the accused solely
because of their governmental role to exercise state criminal power.135
Further, the information is provided to them from the investigative arm of
the State, which obtained information through the exercise of coercive
state power. If prosecutors were not representing the sovereign, they simply
would not have access to the personal and highly derogatory information
regarding the alleged criminal conduct of others. It is the People who have
granted police powers to the State in our democratic compact. The State is
to exercise its investigative powers and to provide such information to
prosecutors for the sole purpose of executing the criminal law and
fulfilling society’s interests in deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and
rehabilitation.
Just as defense attorneys do not have a First Amendment right to
disclose confidential information, prosecutors should not have a First
Amendment right to publish information relating to the representation
obtained solely through the exercise of state power—except when the
publication is necessary to society’s purpose in granting access to such
information: namely, the investigation and prosecution of a particular
crime.136 Unnecessary publication of such information undermines the
integrity of the government’s coercive power to obtain information despite
privacy rights, and, as discussed below, can undermine the constitutional
rights of the accused.137
of the client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .” (emphasis added)).
131. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.6 cmt. [5] (2011) (providing examples of circumstances in which
disclosure of confidential client information is implicitly authorized).
132. See id. at R. 1.4(a)(1) (requiring attorneys to “promptly inform the client of any decision
or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required by these Rules”
(emphasis added)).
133. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all . . . .”).
134. R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 2–3 (2005).
135. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice?,” 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 626 (1999) (providing that, because of the prosecutor’s special relationship with the sovereign,
the prosecutor “wield[s] not only superior financial resources but also the human resources of
police departments or other investigative agencies”).
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f).
137. See infra Subsections IV.A.2–5 (explaining that the prosecution should not undermine a
defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence, coerce an unjust plea, exacerbate harm to a
defendant’s reputation, or undermine the defendant’s right to a fair trial).
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Additionally, the incentives for disclosure are often different for the
prosecution than they are for the defense. The prosecutor, acting as agent
and principal, is not an actor in the underlying case—her actions and the
actions of her client (hopefully) are not generally part of the alleged crime
or controversy. While the defendant and his counsel may likely desire
confidentiality regarding the case, the prosecutor may have no personal
interest in confidentiality regarding the underlying facts of the case (unless,
for example, such publicity would indicate abuse of state power). This
difference arises because the information the prosecutor learns and
discloses is primarily about third persons rather than her own client. Thus,
a prosecutor will often have access to damaging information about the
accused, while the defense generally will not have any information that
would be harmful to the prosecution or her government client. In such
cases, without restrictions on publicity, the prosecution can use
information obtained through state coercive power to the detriment of the
accused, undermining constitutional protections without fear of any similar
harm recurring to herself or her client.
IV. PRETRIAL PUBLICITY RIGHTS UNDER THE
ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE THEORY
Under the access-to-justice theory, and in light of the differences just
outlined, it is essential to examine the roles of the prosecutor and the
defense attorney to determine whether engaging in pretrial publicity is
essential to either role (and thus requires protection) or frustrates that role
(and thus lacks First Amendment protection).
A. The Role and Concomitant Speech Rights of the Prosecutor
Prosecutors play a very unique, specific, and important role in our
justice system. As a representative of the sovereign, the prosecutor
represents society collectively138 in undertaking the sovereign’s “awesome
power to bring criminal charges” against individuals.139 Thus, the central
job of the prosecutor is to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property,
which must be done through just and constitutionally mandated processes.
Both the prosecutor and the defendant—as well as any victims—are
members of the society the prosecutor represents.140 Professor R. Michael
Cassidy elaborates that “[u]nlike other advocates . . . the prosecutor has
obligations of even handedness precisely because he does not represent an
individual but rather the collective good,”141 which requires that “all of
138. CASSIDY, supra note 134, at 2–3.
139. Mosteller, supra note 20, at 1366.
140. See id. (noting that while the prosecutor is primarily a representative of the accuser—the
sovereign—the prosecutor also represents other constituencies, including the public and the public
interest).
141. CASSIDY, supra note 134, at 3.
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[society’s] members are treated fairly and protected from governmental
overreaching.”142 As explained in the ABA Prosecution Function
Standards, “it is fundamental that the prosecutor’s obligation is to protect
the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the
accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public.”143 For “[t]he duty of
the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict,”144 and not to
“maximize potential punishment.”145 The prosecutor’s actions should
reflect society’s valid criminal justice interests in ascertaining guilt and
allocating punishment in accord with deterrence, incapacitation,
retribution, or rehabilitation. It may be that the defendant is innocent, or is
guilty of a lesser offense, or that a lesser punishment or even no
punishment is the just result. Overarchingly, “the prosecutor’s obligation
is . . . to take steps to ensure an accurate result through a fair process.”146 In
an oft-quoted passage, the Supreme Court eloquently explained:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one.147
As examined in Gentile, the traditional compromise for pretrial
publicity is between free speech and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial.148 Similarly, the Restatement identifies as the primary concern
publicity that interferes with the trial proper.149 Yet, the prosecutor’s role is
not limited to trying cases. The prosecutor plays several key roles in the
system of justice from the investigative stage, to the filing of charges, to
142. Id.
143. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS § 3-1.2,
cmt., at 5 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf.
144. Id. § 3-1.2(c).
145. CASSIDY, supra note 134, at 2–4.
146. Id. at 3–4.
147. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
148. See supra Section I.B.
149. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 109, 109 cmt. b, 109
cmt. d (2000).
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bargaining for pleas, to the trial itself. Prosecutorial pretrial publicity can
undermine important interests at each of these stages, including both
constitutionally-mandated interests and interests defined by the role of the
prosecutor to seek justice.
The failure to recognize these other interests is not harmless. Attorney
discipline for violating pretrial publicity rules has often been based on the
timing of the statements and their potential to undermine the trial itself—
with the assumption that the preservation of a fair trial is the primary
interest affected by pretrial publicity.150 Thus, if statements are made well
before trial, an attorney may avoid discipline.151 Because approximately
95% of state and federal criminal cases are not tried, but are pled,152 the
prosecutor can engage in whatever publicity she wishes—negatively
affecting the interests of the accused—without risking discipline for
violating the rule. But in addition to affecting a fair trial, prosecutorial
pretrial publicity can undermine the presumption of innocence, interfere
with an accused’s ability to obtain a fair plea, and ruin a defendant’s
reputation and liberty—even if all charges are ultimately dropped or the
defendant is ultimately acquitted.
1. Free Speech Right to Publish the Indictment
When attorney speech protection is properly attuned to the role of the
attorney in the justice system, there are instances in which attorneys have
greater free speech rights than nonlawyer citizens. As Freedman and
Starwood recognized, “in at least one important respect, the prosecutor’s
rights of expression are broader than those of the ordinary citizen.”153
Namely, “the prosecutor is specially privileged . . . to go beyond the
bounds that normally restrict other citizens by publishing charges in an
150. The ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT for Rule 3.6 state that “timing
has proved to be an important criterion in assessing [a statement’s] potential for prejudice.”
BENNETT et al., CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 57, § 3.6 annot.
Similarly, the Restatement identifies as a primary concern, comments that contaminate a jury or
influence a prospective witness—both concerns directed solely at publicity that interferes with the
trial proper. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 109(a), 109 cmt. b
(2013). In comment (d), the Restatement explains that the substantial likelihood of material
prejudice prohibition “deals only with public comment by an advocate likely to reach a lay
factfinder or witness through the media.” Id. § 109 cmt. (d) (emphasis added).
151. See BENNETT et al., CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 57, § 3.6 annot. (noting
that the timing of the lawyer’s statement is an important criterion in determining whether the
lawyer’s statement will be “the subject of a disciplinary proceeding or a motion in a pending
proceeding”). The Restatement explains that “timing may be relevant,” and thus, “a statement made
long before a jury is to be selected presents less risk.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 109, cmt. c.
152. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PROSECUTING
CRIME 1016 (4th ed. 2010).
153. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 617.
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indictment that might otherwise constitute defamation.”154 Prosecutors
appropriately are protected in making statements as part of their advocacy
function in initiating or presenting the State’s case, which includes
publishing charges in an indictment.155 Indeed, they have absolute
immunity in performing those functions, meaning “prosecutors are
immunized even when the plaintiff establishes that the prosecutor acted
intentionally, in bad faith, and with malice.”156 Although lay persons under
such circumstances would be subject to a defamation lawsuit—even by
public officials and figures under the liberal New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan standard157—prosecutors have a speech right to make statements
in the indictment, regardless of motive or malice.
In a more recent publication, Freedman and Smith argue instead that
prosecutors acting in their official capacities simply “are not protected by
the First Amendment,” citing Garcetti v. Ceballos.158 In its broad
pronouncements, Garcetti might be said to stand for such a proposition.159
Nevertheless, other commentators have not read Garcetti’s holding as
categorically foreclosing prosecutorial free speech rights,160 and it would
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (explaining that prosecutor
actions “in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occurr in the
course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity”);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (recognizing absolute immunity for prosecutor’s
conduct “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case”).
156. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV.
53, 54 & n.6 (noting that, in some cases, “prosecutors received absolute immunity for inducing
perjury, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, fabricating evidence and presenting false
testimony, improperly influencing witnesses, initiating a prosecution without probable cause, and
breaching plea agreements”). Johns argues that absolute immunity is not necessary to protect the
judicial system and prosecutorial function and “the defense of qualified immunity will protect all
but the most incompetent and willful wrongdoers.” See id. at 55.
157. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that public officials can only recover for
defamation if the statement was made with actual malice, which requires a showing that the speaker
knew the statement was false or made the statement with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity).
158. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 11, at 306 n.99 (4th ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
159. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of
Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 37 (2008) (“The breadth of Garcetti’s holding is
remarkable. Under Garcetti, any duty-related speech of a public employee is denied constitutional
protection, no matter how valuable its contribution to public discussion and debate . . . .”).
160. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of
Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 34 (2009) (proposing “a less
deferential approach to assessing” government expression and arguing that Garcetti should apply
only to “the speech of public employees that [the government] has specifically hired to deliver a
particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin and thus open to meaningful
credibility and accountability checks by the public”); Rosenthal, supra note 159, at 39 (arguing that
the Court in Garcetti embraced a new First Amendment inquiry that focuses on “an identification of
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compound the errors of that case to do so. The Garcetti Court held that a
deputy district attorney, Richard Ceballos, could be punished by his
employer for his speech in fulfilling what he understood were his
obligations under Brady v. Maryland161 to provide exculpatory materials to
the defense.162 Without examining whether the materials fell within
Brady’s requirements, the Court held that when “mak[ing] statements
pursuant to their official duties,” government employees “are not speaking
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”163
As indicated by the access-to-justice theory, Garcetti was wrongly
decided.164 The prosecutor’s right to engage in speech that is essential to
the role of the prosecutor as a minister of justice—including speech that
secures the rights of the accused—is a prime example of speech essential
to the system of justice and entitled to core free speech protection. Thus,
even if Garcetti did stand for the proposition that prosecutors do not have
First Amendment rights for official duties, that would be a flawed
approach for determining essential free speech rights of prosecutors.
Moreover, as broadly as the Supreme Court painted in Garcetti, the case
does not readily stand for the proposition that prosecutors have no First
Amendment rights whenever acting as a prosecutor. The Garcetti Court
did not even cite to Gentile or in any way indicate that its holding
implicated (let alone overturned) Gentile or First Amendment rights of
prosecutors to engage in pretrial publicity.
Although this paper will not catalog a prosecutor’s speech rights, under
the access-to-justice theory prosecutors do have First Amendment rights in
their official capacities—including, at their core, free speech rights to
fulfill their role in the system of justice. Prosecutors have speech rights to
invoke government power on behalf of their sovereign client to protect the
public interest and promote the fair administration of the laws, to initiate
criminal proceedings, to access court processes and make relevant and
colorable arguments therein, and to engage in speech that is necessary to
protect the constitutional and legal rights of the accused.
the scope of legitimate managerial prerogatives,” which prerogatives extend “only to
constitutionally permissible managerial objectives”).
161. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
162. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414–15, 421; see also id. at 442 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing
Ceballos’ belief that Brady required him to give to defense counsel an internal memorandum as
exculpatory evidence).
163. Id. at 421 (majority opinion).
164. See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and Garcetti,
77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1331–32 (2012) (arguing that Garcetti was wrongly decided and its illeffects are exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011)
decision); Tarkington, supra note 22, at 91–95 (arguing that Garcetti is flawed and that its rule
exacerbates problems surrounding prosecutorial disregard of Brady’s requirements); Margaret
Tarkington, Government Speech and the Publicly Employed Attorney, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2175,
2176–79 (arguing that Garcetti was wrongly decided).
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2. No Right to Undermine the Presumption of Innocence
The traditional compromise embraced in Gentile identifies the right to a
fair trial as the sole competing interest with free speech.165 Yet the
prosecutor plays a central role in the system of justice, starting in the
investigative stage and with the decision to bring charges. Prosecutorial
pretrial publicity can affect the proper and constitutional functioning of the
criminal justice system from the outset of a case. A notable example is the
presumption of innocence—that a person is presumed innocent until
proven guilty—which is a “basic rule of both criminal and constitutional
law.”166
Historically, the presumption had two separate and important
components.167 First, it constituted a “rule of proof,” namely, that the
prosecution bore the burden to prove guilt at trial.168 Second, it was a
“shield against punishment” before conviction, meaning that the accused
could not be subjected to pretrial punishment and was to be treated with
the dignity accorded to other presumptively innocent people in society.169
In Bell v. Wolfish,170 the Supreme Court appeared to limit the presumption
of innocence as solely creating a “rule of proof” for trial and not having
application pretrial.171 The Bell Court recognized a separate due process
right to protect criminal defendants from “punish[ment] prior to an
adjudication of guilt.”172 Unfortunately, however, the Court defined that
right so narrowly as to be ineffectual.173
165. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion of
the court) (noting the Court’s attempt to strike a balance between the “First Amendment rights of
attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in fair trials”).
166. See Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 260 (2002).
167. See generally François Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in the French
and Anglo-American Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 109–10 (2010) (tracing the historical
understanding and application of the presumption of innocence in French, English, and American
legal systems and showing that the presumption of innocence served, in both the civil law and the
common law, as a pretrial protection against punishment as well as a rule of proof for trial).
168. See id. at 108–10.
169. See id. at 108–10, 148 (“The issue is ultimately . . . whether persons accused of crime are
treated with the dignity and respect due to presumably innocent individuals.”).
170. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
171. See id. at 533. In Bell, the Court stated:
The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in
criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury to judge an
accused’s guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial . . . . But it has
no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during
confinement before his trial has even begun.”
Id. (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 535.
173. The majority opinion established a standard for determining when a condition of pretrial
detention constitutes punishment. Id. at 539. The Court determined: “[I]f a particular condition or
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Nevertheless, some states have rejected Bell and still treat the
presumption of innocence as applying and protecting the accused in pretrial
contexts.174 Further, recent scholarship has read Bell as limited to its
factual context of addressing the constitutionality of conditions of
confinement for those in pretrial detention.175 Scholars have also grounded
the presumption of innocence in the Due Process Clauses and the Sixth
Amendment, arguing that the presumption declares fundamental
constitutional law that serves the historical dual purpose of protecting
individuals before trial and providing the appropriate burden of proof
during trial.176 Importantly, prosecutorial pretrial publicity can undermine
both aspects of the presumption. First, prosecutorial pretrial publicity can
expose the accused to punishment and loss of dignity and reputation prior
to trial and conviction. Second, prosecutorial pretrial publicity can
undermine the burden of proof at trial.
The pretrial purposes of the presumption are grounded in the
Constitution and political theory. Professor Shima Baradaran has traced the
constitutional history of the presumption back to the Magna Carta and to
the early United States as an essential component of due process and of the
constitutional compact between the individual and government.177
Professor Rinat Kitai has similarly argued that the presumption of
innocence “operates to balance the State’s power against the freedom of
the individual.”178 Kitai explains:
The State’s power to impose punishment on individuals is
almost unlimited. Thus, there is great danger in granting the
State an unlimited authority to use this power against the
individual prior to his conviction . . . . The presumption of
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does
not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Id. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, challenged the
majority’s formulation and argued that “[i]t is readily apparent that this standard is nothing more
than the ‘rational basis’ requirement.” See id. at 584 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
similarly noted that the majority’s test was “ineffectual” and “lacks any real content”—which
Marshall found “unsupportable, given that all of these detainees are presumptively innocent and
many are confined solely because they cannot afford bail.” See id. at 563, 565 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
174. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 766
& n.231 (2011) (noting the divergence among state courts as to the pretrial applicability of the
presumption of innocence).
175. See id. at 776.
176. See id. at 727–37 (discussing due process and historical basis for the presumption of
innocence); see generally, Shima Baradaran, The Presumption of Punishment, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY (June 6, 2013), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11572-013-9236-7/
fulltext.html (arguing the constitutional basis for pretrial presumption under historical due process
and Sixth Amendment jury trial rights); Quintard-Morénas, supra note 167, at 107–10 (reviewing
historical and constitutional understanding of presumption in French and Anglo-American law).
177. See Baradaran, supra note 176.
178. Kitai, supra note 166, at 280.
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innocence . . . prevents and limits the State from acting
against a person until his conviction. It constitutes the
guarantee, for guilty and innocent persons alike, that the
State cannot impose punishment prior to conviction . . . . [I]f
the imposition of measures of punishment were possible at
any time prior to conviction, the individual could not be
protected from arbitrary and abusive behavior by the State.179
Prosecutors are part of the enforcement arm of the state. They can
literally destroy people’s lives with their state power to charge and
prosecute crime and with the damning information regarding others to
which they are privy as part of their office. But the presumption of
innocence checks that power. As Baradaran shows, this check on power is
grounded in the Due Process Clauses and the Sixth Amendment: The State,
including the prosecution, cannot impose punishment against an accused
until they are convicted by a jury of the accused’s peers.180 Thus, quoting
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Southern Union Co. v. United
States,181 Baradaran argues that the “jury acts ‘as a bulwark between the
State and the accused,’” prohibiting punishment until “‘the prosecution has
proved each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’”182
Prosecutorial pretrial publicity can impose pretrial punishment on an
individual. That punishment may come in the form of loss of reputation
and dignity, loss of society, and loss of business (as demonstrated by the
Gentile case itself)183—even when there is no pretrial incarceration.184 The
prosecutor has access to highly derogatory information about people, but
this access is provided by the State and its investigative arm for the sole
purpose of justly pursuing criminal charges against those who are guilty
and not for use against the innocent.185 Moreover, because the public and
179. Id. at 280–81 (emphasis added).
180. Baradaran, supra note 176 (“The Due Process Clause, taken together with the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and presumption of innocence, mandates that a jury assess the facts
of all elements of the crime charged and prevent conviction without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact that constitutes the crime.” (citations omitted)).
181. 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
182. Baradaran, supra note 176 (quoting S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2350–51).
183. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1040 (1991) (noting that following the
pretrial announcement, Western Vault suffered heavy economic losses and soon went out of
business due to the loss of customers); Kitai, supra note 166, at 284 (noting that pretrial stages may
impose physical or mental damages on the accused and that “[e]ven if a person’s guilt is never
proven, the individual suffers a unique humiliation that can last months and even years”).
184. Baradaran’s arguments are aimed at curbing pretrial detention, yet she concludes that it is
essential to adhere to the presumption of innocence (especially as grounded in the historical
understanding of due process and the jury trial right) because “the presumption protects in places
that a modern understanding and application of due process procedures cannot reach.” See
Baradaran, supra note 176. Prosecutorial pretrial publicity is such an area where the presumption of
innocence is needed.
185. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/2

30

Tarkington: Lost in Compromise: Free Speech, Criminal Justice, and Attorney P

2014]

LOST IN THE COMPROMISE

1903

press are aware of the prosecutor’s special access to information, any
statements made by a prosecutor may be regarded as especially accurate.
The presumption of innocence not only protects the individual from the
State’s power, but moreover, as Kitai explains, it preserves “a partnership
between the individual and the State.”186 In a democracy, as part of the
compact between the individual and the state, the individual agrees to
abide by the laws of the State, but the State agrees not to punish the
individual unless and until she is convicted of a crime.187 The commission
of a crime creates a conflict between the State and the individual, as does
the State’s accusation against the person to be held responsible for that
crime, labeled a criminal, and stripped of freedoms generally available to
the populace.188 Kitai argues that the presumption lessens the alienation
between the individual and the State.189 Whether innocent or guilty, the
presumption of innocence emphasizes the dignity and freedom of the
individual and “her right not to be exposed to unjustified harm by the
State.”190
In representing the State, the prosecutor also represents society as a
whole, including the accused.191 Pretrial publicity by the prosecutor that
treats the accused as a criminal prior to conviction, exacerbates alienation
between the individual and the State, and undermines the constitutional
compact that the accused is innocent in the eyes of the State unless and
until proven guilty. When the prosecutor engages in such pretrial publicity,
he not only undermines these purposes as to that specific individual, but
for all members of society, who may rightly begin to wonder whether or
not they can trust the State not to subject them to punishment prior to
conviction. Indeed, Kitai argues that in addition to any harm actually felt
by the accused, the “very treatment of the individual by the State as guilty
before conviction creates moral harm,” which “emanates from the breach
of the State’s commitment to preserve an individual’s status as innocent”
prior to conviction.192
Consequently, Kitai argues that “the presumption of innocence should
prohibit the State from taking steps that reflect an assumption of guilt of
the accused that are not strictly necessary in order to conduct the
investigation and trial.”193 Under the access-to-justice theory, it is contrary
to the prosecutor’s role to undermine the purposes and constitutional
186. Kitai, supra note 166, at 281.
187. Id. at 280–83.
188. Id. at 283.
189. Id.
190. Id. 282–83.
191. Mosteller, supra note 20, at 1366 (noting that the prosecutor, as a representative of the
sovereign, represents various constituencies, including the accuser, the public, and even those
charged with a crime).
192. Kitai, supra note 166, at 288 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 292 (emphasis added and omitted).
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underpinnings of the presumption of innocence. Thus, the state can
constitutionally prohibit any prosecutorial pretrial publicity that treats the
accused as if already convicted (or with an assumption of guilt), unless the
speech is essential to a valid investigative or trial purpose. A regulation
like the federal CFR—which categorizes specific topics that Department of
Justice personnel are not to discuss with the press,194 in addition to
prohibiting them from arranging “perp walks,”195 and from discussing even
admissible evidence196—is thus constitutionally permissible. The CFR
contains a short list of things that federal prosecutors can publicly say,
including basic identifying information regarding an accused, but then
limits even this category by concluding:
Disclosures should include only incontrovertible, factual
matters, and should not include subjective observations. In
addition, where background information or information
relating to the circumstances of an arrest or investigation
would be highly prejudicial or where the release thereof
would serve no law enforcement function, such information
should not be made public.197
Such a standard is far more restrictive than the Gentile standard. But the
CFR standard comports with the purposes of the presumption of innocence
and the role of the prosecutor in the justice system, and so it is
constitutional under the access-to-justice theory. Similarly, prohibitions on
prosecutorial publicity that “heighten[s] public condemnation of the
accused,” as found in the Restatement and MRPC 3.8, are constitutionally
permissible—even if more restrictive than the normal MRPC 3.6 standard,
and even if such prohibitions violate Gentile’s equality principle by not
including similar restrictions on defense publicity regarding the
government.
The presumption of innocence is also beneficial to the just
investigation, prosecution, and resolution of criminal proceedings. The
presumption reminds the prosecution, law enforcement, and the public that
the accused might ultimately be found innocent,198 which provides a
pretrial check to prosecutorial overconfidence in the strength of the case
194. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.2(b)(3)(i)–(iv) (2012) (limiting permitted disclosures).
195. See id. § 50.2(b)(7) (“Personnel of the Department of Justice should take no action to
encourage or assist news media in photographing or televising a defendant or accused person being
held or transported in Federal custody.”).
196. See id. § 50.2(b)(6)(v) (prohibiting Justice Department personnel from making “[s]tatements
concerning evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence or argument
will be used at trial”).
197. Id. § 50.2(b)(3)(iv) (emphasis added).
198. See Kitai, supra note 166, at 279–80 (arguing that the presumption of innocence
encourages the recognition that the accused might be innocent and therefore also encourages law
enforcement agencies to pursue both incriminating and exculpatory evidence).
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against the accused. Pretrial publicity by the prosecution undermines this
salutary purpose of the presumption. Michael Nifong’s statements about
the Duke Lacrosse players present a poignant example of how a
prosecutor’s pretrial publicity can wed him to the charges despite even
overwhelming evidence that develops to the contrary.199 Once a
prosecutor—a political actor—makes public statements about a
prosecution, he will be held politically accountable and feel political
pressure to live up to those statements.200 This can blind the prosecutor to
mitigating evidence and put pressure on the prosecutor to achieve a
particular result rather than to do his job: to seek justice.
Finally, prosecutorial pretrial publicity can undermine the interest
recognized by Bell itself: the prosecutorial burden of proof. The Bell Court
explained that the presumption “allocates the burden of proof” and serves
to admonish the jury to determine “an accused’s guilt or innocence solely
on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of . . . other matters
not introduced as proof at trial.”201 As discussed below, prosecutorial
pretrial publicity can negatively affect a jury’s verdict and perception of the
evidence.202 Thus, the trial aspect of the presumption of innocence can be
undermined by pretrial publicity that can influence the jury into carrying a
presumption of guilt.
3. No Right to Coerce an Unjust Plea
Prosecutorial pretrial publicity can also affect the defendant’s decision
and ability to take a plea, for example, by coercing the defendant to plead
in order to end continued scandal in the press.203 While the traditional
compromise focuses on pretrial publicity as it may affect the right to a fair
trial, the Sixth Amendment’s “public trial, by an impartial jury”204 has
become occasional, and plea bargains are the norm. Over 95% of federal
and state criminal charges end in a plea.205 As the Supreme Court has
199. See Mosteller, supra note 20, at 1337, 1349, 1358–64 (showing that Nifong gave fifty to
seventy press interviews in the first week after being briefed about the allegations, but then
continued with the charges for months on end after receiving exculpatory DNA evidence).
200. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2472 (2004) (“Prosecutors are particularly concerned about their reputations because they are
a politically ambitious bunch. Most district attorneys are elected, and many have parlayed their
prosecutorial successes into political careers . . . .”).
201. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
202. See infra Subsection IV.A.5.
203. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 600 n.24 (1976) (Bennan, J., concurring)
(noting prevalence of pleading and instructing judges to “guard against the danger that pretrial
publicity has effectively coerced the defendant into pleading guilty”).
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 152, at 1016 (showing that in fiscal year 2004,
approximately 96% of federal charges resulted in nontrial convictions, and over 95% of state felony
convictions were procured by guilty pleas).
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recently recognized: “The reality is that plea bargains have become so
central to the administration of the criminal justice system” that it “is
insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop
that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”206 Pretrial publicity that
can unjustly manipulate a plea is thus not inoculated by the fact that it did
not undermine the actual trial. Current prohibitions on pretrial publicity are
aimed at safeguarding trial and empaneling an impartial jury; they are not
keyed to publicity that may affect a plea, and thus, they fail to protect the
accused’s actual interests in modern criminal process.
Scholars have examined the factors, pressures, and incentives at play in
plea bargaining to determine whether pleas actually reflect a fair trial and
reflect society’s valid criminal justice interests in ascertaining guilt and
allocating appropriate punishment.207 Problematically, much of what
occurs in plea bargaining is secretive and unknown.208 While scholars
disagree about the workings and desirability of plea bargaining,209 there are
several key understandings that are important when examining the
potential effect of pretrial publicity on pleas.
The core premise of plea bargaining is that it approximates the result of
trial while avoiding the costs of trial—a plea equals the approximate trial
result minus some fixed discount for saving the costs of trial.210 Plea
206. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (emphasis added).
207. See Bibas, supra note 200, at 2469–2527 (examining and identifying existing structural
distortions, costs, incentives, and psychological phenomena inherent in plea bargaining and
concluding that “the classical model of fully informed and rational bargaining in the shadow of
trial . . . . is seriously misleading”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE
L.J. 1979, 1980–91, 2003 (1992) (examining structural flaws and incentives inherent in plea
bargaining and discussing the importance of transparency and open adversarial proceedings to
mitigate such flaws and more closely comport with the criminal justice system’s goal of ascertaining
guilt and appropriating punishment)). See generally H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea
Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 64–66, 89–
96 (2011) (describing the problem of coercive plea bargaining and proposing a solution).
208. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 200, at 2475 (noting that “plea bargaining is hidden from
public view” and is “a secret area of law”); Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 2002 (“In plea
bargaining, the attorney’s role is virtually immune from scrutiny or control.” (emphasis added)).
209. Compare Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 2000–09 (advocating abolition of plea
bargaining), and Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 52 (1968) (same), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969, 1975 (1992) (arguing that plea bargaining is a desired and efficient form of bargaining
essential to secure scarce judicial resources), and Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1909–10 (1992) (arguing that, under classical
contract theory, plea bargaining “supports the freedom to bargain over criminal punishment”).
Some scholars focus on reforming discrete conditions of plea bargaining. See Caldwell, supra note
207, at 77 (“Rather than complete abolition, it is the unethical abuse of the [prosecution’s] unique
bargaining position[] that needs to be eradicated.”); cf. Fred Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1998) (“accept[ing] plea bargaining as a given” and instead
“focus[ing] on the ethical role of prosecutors” in plea bargaining).
210. See Bibas, supra note 200, at 2464 (“The conventional wisdom is that litigants bargain
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bargaining, ideally, takes place in “the shadow of expected trial
outcomes,”211 with the parties’ expectations regarding trial results as the
central bargaining chip. Thus, for a defendant, the most important factor is
her understanding of the strength of the prosecution’s case against her.212
One of the core inadequacies in plea bargaining is the parties’ lack of
knowledge regarding the merits of the case.213 Unlike civil proceedings,
criminal procedure in most states includes extremely limited pretrial
discovery.214 Thus, the defendant may have to guess at the strength of the
prosecutor’s case.215 Pretrial publicity by the prosecutor can skew the
defendant’s view of the merits of the prosecutor’s case and, thus, lead the
defendant to plead guilty to charges that may be unwarranted by the
evidence—especially where such publicity leads to condemnation of the
defendant from family, friends, and associates.
Plea bargaining involves acute inequities in the respective bargaining
positions of the prosecution and the defense. Unlike civil proceedings,
where a civil defendant can often inflict equal costs on the plaintiff through
counterclaims, discovery, and other devices, the criminal defendant can do
nothing to pressure or harm the prosecution.216 In contrast, the prosecutor
“can exercise coercion unilaterally for the purpose of encouraging a
settlement; for example, by threatening lengthy pretrial detention and
interfering with a defendant’s ability to earn his livelihood.”217 Moreover,
the defendant is threatened with loss of liberty (and perhaps life),
reputation, employment, association with family and friends, and personal
interests and affairs. The prosecution, comparatively, has nothing to
lose.218 At the very most, the prosecutor will lose a case if it goes to trial

toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial outcomes. In this model, rational parties forecast
the expected trial outcome and strike bargains that leave both sides better off by splitting the saved
costs of trial.”).
211. Id. at 2464–65.
212. Cf. id. at 2470 (“The strength of the prosecution’s case is the most important factor, but
other considerations come into play.” (footnote omitted)).
213. Id. at 2495–96 (“The result of inadequate discovery is that the parties bargain
blindfolded.”); Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 1998 (noting that the “expansion of pretrial
discovery” would “directly address the flaws of plea bargaining” so parties could “accurately
estimate ex ante the likelihood of conviction at trial”); Zacharias, supra note 209, at 1129–32
(noting the lack of “fully available information by both negotiating parties” and that “[i]n most
jurisdictions, bilateral discovery is limited severely” in criminal proceedings).
214. Zacharias, supra note 209, at 1129–31.
215. See Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 2002 (stating that pleas are based on “an uninformed
guess about the likelihood of conviction”).
216. Zacharias, supra note 209, at 1133–34.
217. Id. (footnote omitted).
218. See Caldwell, supra note 207, at 74 (“If defendants do not settle, they face the potential
loss of entire years of freedom, connection with loved ones, and earning capacity, among other
potential costs—prosecutors do not face any such losses.”).
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and the defendant is acquitted.219 Yet if the defendant pleads (even to
significantly lower charges), the prosecutor gets a “win” for her conviction
rate.220
Plea bargaining is complicated by agency costs.221 Prosecutors represent
the State and society and are obligated to seek justice. Yet as political
actors, they have incentives to enhance their own reputations, obtain high
conviction rates, avoid embarrassing losses, and control workloads.222
Overall, these incentives work to create a strong preference for pleas over
trials—as pleading takes less time and every plea is a win for the
prosecution (a conviction), while trials risk being a loss.223
While such incentives appear compatible with legitimate criminal
justice ends and judicial resources, they have produced some recognized
perverse results. As catalogued by many scholars, prosecutors have a
strong incentive to pursue a plea when the evidence of guilt is weak—
which includes some scenarios where defendants are in fact innocent.224
Rather than dismissing charges—resulting in a “loss” for the prosecutor’s
conviction rate and perhaps exposing a faulty investigation that targeted
innocent people225—prosecutors can get a “win” and avoid harming their
219. Cf. id. (noting that defendants risk loss of freedom, time with loved ones, and economic
production at the plea bargaining phase, yet the prosecution “only stand to lose time and resources
spent going to trial”).
220. See Bibas, supra note 200, at 2471 (“[P]rosecutors want to ensure convictions. They may
further their careers by racking up good win-loss records, in which every plea bargain counts as a
win but trials risk being losses.”).
221. Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 1987 (noting that the complex negotiating framework
features parties in interest who are represented by agents—prosecutor and defense counsel—whose
conflicting goals create a problem of agency costs). Schulhofer further notes that there are agency
costs between the state’s interest in criminal justice and the chief prosecutor’s goals to “enhance her
reputation and her political standing” as an elected official. Id. at 1987. Moreover, he notes “there is
an additional layer of agency problems in the relationship between the chief prosecutor and her
assistants.” Id. at 1987–88; accord Bibas, supra note 200, at 2470–72 (noting several conflicting
interests of the prosecutor that may interfere with that prosecutor’s justice seeking function).
222. See Bibas, supra note 200, at 2471–72; Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 1987–88.
223. See Bibas, supra note 200, at 2471 (discussing the prosecutor’s incentive to ensure good
win-loss records by plea bargaining rather than going to trial, which involves a risk of loss);
Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 1987 (noting that while the typical prosecutor occasionally tries
cases that could be disposed of more efficiently, the prosecutor “will want to ensure settlement,
even if this requires overly generous plea offers”).
224. See Alschuler, supra note 209, at 52, 59 (interviewing prosecutors in ten major
metropolitan areas and reporting comments from prosecutors such as, “[w]hen we have a weak case
for any reason, we’ll reduce to almost anything rather than lose” and “[t]he only time we make a
deal is when there is a weakness in the case” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bibas, supra note
200, at 2473 (noting prosecutors “can make irresistible offers in weak cases” and doing so may
serve to “cover up faulty investigations that mistakenly target innocent suspects”).
225. Bibas, supra note 200, at 2473 (noting that if prosecutors can “buy off credible claims of
innocence cheaply, they [can] cover up faulty investigations that mistakenly target innocent
suspects”).
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own careers if they can instead get a defendant to plead.226 Shockingly,
both DNA exonerations and police scandals have demonstrated that a
significant number of innocent people plead guilty in our criminal justice
system,227 in addition to unknown numbers who plead falsely to minor
crimes.228
In our system of justice, the role of the prosecutor “is to do justice.”229
As the Supreme Court has explained: “It is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.”230 Yet it is “[t]he universal rule”—according to Professor Albert
Alschuler after interviewing prosecutors across the country—for
prosecutors to increase pressures to plead when a case is particularly
weak.231 When a case is weak, and acquittal probable, the obvious and just
answer is that charges should be dropped—not that the prosecution should
get a win through a plea deal and the accused should become a convicted
criminal. Prosecutors should not be given and do not need any further tools
to pressure defendants into pleading, including entering pleas that do not
reflect the evidence against the accused. To the extent that pretrial
publicity can be used as an “improper method” pressuring defendants and
skewing the justness of plea bargains, it is contrary to the role of the
prosecutor to engage in the practice.
226. See Alschuler, supra note 209, at 62 (“When prosecutors respond to a likelihood of
acquittal by magnifying the pressures to plead guilty, they seem to exhibit a remarkable disregard
for the danger of false conviction.”); see also id. at 61–62 (relating stories where innocent
defendants were offered and subsequently took an extraordinary reduction in charges as a plea deal
rather than risking conviction of initial serious charges with attendant severe punishment).
227. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533–35 (2005) (noting several scandals in jurisdictions where scores
of individuals falsely pled guilty to charges, one of which involved between 100 to 150 people—
mostly young Hispanic males—who falsely pled guilty to gun or drug charges); Rodney Uphoff,
Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 739, 796–802
(countering the “myth” that the innocent do not plead guilty, and recounting numerous cases where
later-exonerated criminal defendants had previously pled guilty in face of pressures to plead).
228. Gross et al., supra note 227, at 536 (explaining from exoneration data that “nobody, it
seems, seriously pursues exonerations for defendants who are falsely convicted of shop lifting,
misdemeanor assault, drug possession, or routine felonies—auto thefts or run-of-the-mill
burglaries—and sentenced to probation, a $2000 fine, or even six months in the county jail or
eighteen months in state prison,” but concluding from pretrial detention and other indicators that
“[s]ome defendants who accept [such plea] deals are innocent, possibly in numbers that dwarf false
convictions in the less common but more serious violent felonies, but they are almost never
exonerated”).
229. Mosteller, supra note 20, at 1365 (“A fundamental ethical duty of a prosecutor is
described generally as ‘the duty to seek justice’ or ‘to do justice.’” (footnote omitted)).
230. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
231. See Alschuler, supra note 209, at 60; see also id. at 66 (quoting a defense attorney as
saying, “the tendency is always to plead people who are effectively unconvictable” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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A related and recognized coercive tool available to prosecutors is to
overcharge defendants—prosecutors charge defendants with higher-level
offenses or more counts of an offense than are supported by the
evidence.232 Prosecutors are ethically prohibited from bringing charges that
are not supported by probable cause.233 As Professor H. Michael Caldwell
has remarked, “whenever a prosecutorial agency files charges that are
disproportionate or misrepresentative of the defendant’s actions, that
agency runs afoul of the ethical guidelines governing prosecutors, abuses
its prosecutorial power, and compromises the justice system as a whole.”234
Despite these ethical duties and the severe consequences to the life and
liberty of accused persons, prosecutors have “a powerful incentive to begin
the inevitable negotiating process from a position of strength, which often
results in overcharging.”235 Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suit
regarding their charging functions, so they are not accountable to the
accused for overcharging.236 Overcharging can scare the defendant into
pleading because the sheer volume or severity of charges may have an
adverse effect on the jury and therefore work to the advantage of the
prosecutor if the case goes to trial.237 Overcharging can also convince the
defendant that a prosecutor is giving him a good—and perhaps
irresistible—deal by reducing the charges, when the heightened charges
should not have been brought in the first place.238
Pretrial publicity can add an extra layer of pressure to already-coercive
(and unethical) overcharging. The overcharged defendant is not only
publicly accused of crimes, but is publicly accused of crimes regarding
which there actually was insufficient evidence to have charged her.239
Publicity regarding an overcharged indictment may significantly increase
pressures on the defendant to plead—including pressures from friends,
family, and associates who receive the publicity. Pretrial publicity
232. See Caldwell, supra note 207, at 84 (noting that prosecutors have an “incentive to file
more serious charges than those supported by the evidence” to pressure more risk adverse
defendants to accept a plea).
233. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2014).
234. Caldwell, supra note 207, at 66 (footnotes omitted).
235. Id. at 65; see also Bibas, supra note 200, at 2519 (“The conventional explanation for
overcharging is that it gives prosecutors additional plea-bargaining chips.”).
236. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
237. See Alschuler, supra note 209, at 98–99 (explaining that “overcharging has both an
economic and a psychological effect at trial, and may therefore make trial a less attractive
alternative,” as it increases the cost of the defense, the motions and instructions to be prepared, jury
confusion, and a presumption of guilt).
238. See Alschuler, supra note 209, at 85 (“The charge is the asking price in plea
bargaining . . . .”); Bibas, supra note 200, at 2519 (discussing the anchoring effect of overcharging
and giving the example that “[d]efendants who anchor initially on maximum life sentences are more
likely to think they are getting good deals when they are offered lower sentences”).
239. See Caldwell, supra note 207, at 83–84 (arguing that prosecutors overcharge defendants
to seek harsher penalties than the underlying evidence warrants).
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regarding an overcharged indictment manifestly heightens public
condemnation of the accused by bringing condemnation for crimes beyond
what can be or is even expected to be proven at trial. It seems obvious that
being charged with first-degree murder will bring greater public
condemnation than being charged for involuntary manslaughter. Similarly,
a charge for forcible rape is going to bring more public condemnation
against the defendant than a charge for battery.240 An indictment containing
fourteen counts of a certain crime is likely more damaging to a defendant’s
reputation than an indictment for one count.241 Moreover, upon hearing of
a multiple-count indictment, the public may be more likely to form an
opinion that the accused is guilty. As Alschuler notes about the effects of
overcharging at trial, a jury, upon hearing “an endless list of charges”
against the defendant, tends to think, “[t]he District Attorney could be
wrong once, but no one could be wrong this often.”242 The public—from
which the jury venire is selected—may have the same reaction to a
publicized announcement from the prosecution that an accused has been
arrested on twenty counts of a particular crime. Thus, publicity regarding
an overcharged indictment may further undermine the presumption of
innocence (as well as a fair trial, as noted below) by creating an even
stronger indication of guilt than would publicity about charges for which
there is sufficient evidence.
Prosecutors may avoid pretrial publicity in cases where the evidence is
weak—indeed, plea bargains can hide weak cases from public scrutiny.
Some commentators posit that prosecutors may be more likely to try highprofile cases—even where there is strong evidence of guilt or where a
defendant may have wanted to plead.243 While the defendant in such a case,
obviously, still has a trial in which guilt is determined by a jury, the flaw is
that the prosecutor’s decision whether to offer a plea bears no relationship
to the criminal justice interests of the sovereign he represents.244 Moreover,
in publicized cases where the evidence is weak, prosecutors may prefer to
seek a plea over a likely acquittal. Alschuler notes that “political
240. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 209, at 61 (relating a case where a defendant was offered, and
accepted a plea deal that reduced charges from kidnapping and forcible rape to one count of simple
battery).
241. See id. at 98 (noting that overcharging may affect the subsequent “reading of the
accusations to the jury” because jurors may be overwhelmed by the amount of allegations lodged by
the prosecutor).
242. Id. at 98–99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. See id. at 107 (noting the “political importance” of “serious, publicized cases, and [that]
in these cases plea agreements are unusually difficult to secure”); Schulhofer, supra note 207, at
1988 (noting that prosecutors “may gain” reputation and career advancement by “trying a case that
the public interest would require to be settled”); see also id. at 1987 (“The chief prosecutor will
occasionally want to try a case that could be resolved more efficiently by settlement.”).
244. See Alschuler, supra note 209, at 64 (noting that trying clear cases and pleading weak
cases is “at best, a dangerous allocation of institutional responsibility” because “[i]f trials ever serve
a purpose, their utility is presumably greatest when the outcome is in doubt”).
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considerations may . . . make it important for a prosecutor to secure a
conviction for a particular crime, and plea negotiation may provide the
only practical means of achieving this objective” precisely because there
exists insufficient evidence to succeed at trial.245
Under the access-to-justice theory, the prosecutor can be forbidden
from engaging in publicity as a coercive tactic to obtain a plea from the
accused. The problem with publicity in this context—as with other
coercive tactics like overcharging and excessive pretrial detention—is that
it is a method for obtaining a plea that is entirely divorced from the merits
of the case, the culpability of the accused,246 or society’s actual interests in
deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation.247 Those interests
are entrusted to the prosecutor, who is then given the State’s “awesome
power” to bring criminal charges against individuals and deprive them of
life or liberty. Once a person pleads guilty, they are a convicted criminal—
they have a criminal record that will follow them and have consequences,
often for the rest of their lives.248 Prosecutors already hold all the chips;
they can exert pressure on the accused to plead even where evidence is
weak and acquittal is likely. Thus, it is entirely appropriate to limit the
ability of the prosecutor to further stack the deck and increase pressure
through pretrial publicity. Publicity that has such an end or effect frustrates
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system and constitutionally
can be prohibited.

245. Id. at 109. Alschuler recounts a high-profile murder of a policeman where the perpetrator
who actually killed the policeman was himself killed in a car chase. Id. at 109. However, the
perpetrator’s girlfriend was arrested and charged with robbery—a crime she apparently participated
in—and with the murder of the police officer. “[A]s the prosecutor admits, the state had no murder
case at all” against her. Id. at 110. “[B]ecause a conviction in connection with the policeman’s
death was important for political reasons,” the prosecutor made a plea deal where the girlfriend pled
guilty to armed robbery and voluntary manslaughter with a total sentence “less severe than that she
might have received after a trial for the armed robbery alone.” Id. at 110.
246. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (explaining that prosecutors serve the
criminal law, “the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer” (emphasis
added)).
247. See Bibas, supra note 200, at 2468 (noting that rather than focusing on society’s actual
interest, “plea bargaining effectively bases sentences in part on wealth, sex, age, education,
intelligence, and confidence”); Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 2003 (arguing “that plea bargaining
injures the public interest in optimal deterrence, the defendant’s interest in accurately assessing the
risk of acquittal, and the societal interest in minimizing conviction of the innocent”).
248. See, e.g., Lahny R. Silva, In Search of a Second Chance: Channeling BMW v. Gore and
Reconsidering Occupational Licensing Restrictions, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 499 (2012) (“Today
there are approximately 38,000 statutory and regulatory disqualifications triggered solely by the fact
of prior felony conviction. This amounts to an average of 700 per jurisdiction, and it is estimated
that 65% of these are employment related.” (footnote omitted)).
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4. No Right to Exacerbate Harm to the Accused’s Reputation
Perhaps most obviously, the prosecutor can wreak serious reputational
harm on the accused through pretrial publicity, particularly pretrial
publicity that treats the accused as guilty, contains inculpatory information,
or arouses public passions and emotion against the accused. The Duke
Lacrosse players were the subject of national shame when Michael Nifong
publicly accused them of “gang-like rape” performed with “racial hostility”
and described the rape as having “a deep racial motivation” that was
“absolutely unconscionable” and “totally abhorrent . . . . add[ing] another
layer of reprehensibleness, to a crime that is already reprehensible.”249
Although reputational harm is one of the most obvious problems
associated with prosecutorial publicity, the Supreme Court has held that
governmental deprivation of “reputation” alone is insufficient to create a
due process violation.250 Rather, a criminal defendant whose reputation is
harmed by government actions must show “stigma-plus,” meaning that the
reputational harm must result in an independent constitutional violation.251
Indeed, in December 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that several of the Duke Lacrosse players’ due process claims
based on harm to reputation should be dismissed because the plaintiffs had
failed to establish the requisite “plus” constitutional violation.252 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has similarly held that a plaintiff
suing the prosecution for denial of due process based on media statements
that harmed her reputation “must identify a ‘plus’ other than the
indictment, trial, and related events for which the [prosecution] possess[es]
absolute prosecutorial immunity.”253 While other courts have found a
constitutional deprivation of liberty in a prosecutor’s use of knowingly
249. Mosteller, supra note 20, at 1351 (providing excerpts of statements made by disbarred
District Attorney Michael Nifong).
250. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976) (concluding that one’s “interest in
reputation . . . is quite different from the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’’’ interests protected by the Due
Process Clause).
251. See id. at 701 (rejecting “the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more
tangible interests such as employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke
the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause”); Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process
and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 92 (2009) (“The
stigma-plus test places emphasis on the consequences of reputational harm; for example, on whether
there was a coincident loss of employment or a concurrent alteration of some additional right or
status, such as the ability to purchase alcohol.”).
252. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654 n.12, 654–55 (4th Cir. 2012) (dismissing
certain Fourth Amendment claims and explaining that “[t]he parties dispute whether a Fourth
Amendment violation constitutes a cognizable ‘plus,’” yet because the court held that the plaintiffs
failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim, the court does not address that question). Notably, these
dismissed claims were against officers and municipalities, as Nifong had not appealed the district
court’s holding that Nifong did not enjoy qualified immunity for his investigatory actions. See id. at
645 & n.1.
253. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 798 (7th Cir. 1994).
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fabricated evidence to bring about an indictment, pretrial detention, and
related harms,254 the bottom line is that a due process claim against the
prosecutor for depriving the accused of reputation will usually be
unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Supreme Court has not recognized a
constitutional remedy for deprivation of sheer reputation does not mean
that reputation is a legally insignificant interest—nor does it mean that
government must allow its prosecutors to run amok in using information
provided them through the government’s own investigative arm to
unnecessarily destroy the reputations of its citizens. The existence of the
common law tort of defamation shows the enduring societal recognition of
the value of reputation as a legally protected interest. Moreover, some
states have recognized reputation as an interest protected in its own right
by the state’s constitution.255
In any prosecution, the State has used its police powers to obtain access
to the most damning information about people and provides that
information to the prosecutor for one purpose: for the just prosecution of
crime. Under the access-to-justice theory, the prosecutor can be prohibited
from using such information in ways that are inconsistent with that
governmental purpose or that otherwise undermine the core prosecutorial
duty to seek justice. The State neither obtains derogatory information about
citizens nor provides it to the prosecutor for the purpose of arbitrarily
destroying a citizen’s reputation, with attendant social and economic
effects. While reputational harms are a concomitant part of being
prosecuted,256 the prosecution should not be able to exacerbate those harms
through publicity that is unnecessary to the just investigation and
prosecution of a crime, particularly with inflammatory and inculpatory
publicity. Thus, under the access-to-justice theory, the prosecutor lacks a
free speech right to engage in pretrial publicity that is unnecessary for the
just investigation and prosecution of crime and which heightens
reputational harm to the defendant.
Consequently, the Restatement’s prohibition against “heightening
public condemnation of the accused” is constitutionally permissible. This
is so even though the prohibition is aimed at preserving reputation and
even if it is interpreted to impose a more restrictive standard for
prosecutors than defense attorneys in contravention of Gentile’s equality
principle. Similarly, restrictions like those found in the CFR, forbidding
prosecutors from engaging in nearly all inculpatory publicity and from
254. See, e.g., Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 354–55 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting circuit conflict).
255. See, e.g., Dodd v. Reese, 24 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Ind. 1940) (explaining that the Indiana
State Constitution specifically protects reputation in parity with property).
256. See Kitai, supra note 166, at 284 (“A person, innocent as well as guilty, may experience
insult, unfair persecution, rejection, and betrayal as a consequence of being treated like a criminal
prior to conviction.”).
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speaking to the press to arrange a perp walk, are also constitutional because
they safeguard the governmental purpose—doing justice—for which
information is obtained and given to the prosecution as well as protect the
accused’s reputation and associated interests until a jury is able to
determine guilt as required in our constitutional criminal process. A perp
walk (telling the press the time and place of arrest and then having law
enforcement take the accused on a long walk to the police car or station for
a “photo op” of the accused in custody) harms the reputation of the accused
for no just prosecutorial purpose, but for the press to obtain and publish
emotionally charged photos of the accused in actual custody.257 For
example, in 2011, Dominique Strauss-Khan was subjected to a perp walk
in New York City, at a time when he was a forerunner for the 2012 French
presidential election.258 One of the more remarkable aspects of the walk
was New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s comments to the press. While
noting that the perp walk was “humiliating,” Bloomberg said he didn’t
“have a lot of sympathy” for Strauss-Khan, who resigned from his position
as the Managing Director of the International Money Fund within days of
the arrest.259 Bloomberg explained: “if you don’t want to do the perp walk,
don’t do the crime.”260 Apparently having forgotten about the presumption
of innocence, Bloomberg agreed that it would be a “real sad thing [] if
somebody is accused, does the perp walk, and turns out not to have been
guilty. And then society really should look in the mirror and say we should
be more careful the next time.”261 Three months later, a justice in the
Supreme Court of Manhattan dismissed the charges against StraussKhan.262
Indeed, the fact that federal constitutional law is unavailing in providing
the accused with a remedy—combined with general hurdles of immunity
for civil claims against prosecutors—increases the justification for
allowing state regulators to prohibit the prosecution from using publicity to
impose reputational harms on the accused that are unnecessary to the
investigation and prosecution of the crime. The personal impact of
reputational harms is evident in Gentile itself, where the prosecutor’s

257. See, e.g., Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment is violated where the police “force an arrested person to undergo a staged ‘perp walk’
for the benefit of the press, when the walk serves no other law enforcement purpose”).
258. See Daniel Trotta, NY Mayor Defends “Perp Walk” of IMF Chief, REUTERS (May 17,
2011,
9:16
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/18/strausskahn-bloombergidAFN1714122920110518.
259. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. See John Eligon, Strauss-Kahn Drama Ends with Short Final Scene, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/nyregion/charges-against-strauss-kahn-dismissed.
html?pagewanted=all.
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pretrial publicity resulted in Sanders losing his business.263 While the
prosecution should and must be protected in publishing the indictment and
other speech necessary to their official function in prosecuting individuals,
the flip side of that protection is that the State can prohibit the prosecutor
from publicizing information or engaging in publicity that exacerbates
harm to the accused. It is contrary to the role of the prosecutor to use the
information society provides to him through the exercise of coercive state
power to inflict reputational harm on individuals that is unnecessary to the
prosecution of crime. Under the access-to-justice theory, the prosecutor
lacks a free speech right to engage in such publicity.
5. No Speech Right to Undermine a Fair Trial
As recognized even in the traditional compromise, it is an essential part
of the prosecutor’s role to see that the accused receives a fair trial.264 In the
American system of criminal justice, the jury trial right is “no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our
constitutional structure.”265 The jury is a representation of the People
acting as an essential check on government power to deprive individuals of
life or liberty through the execution of criminal law. Thus, the impartial
jury is specifically designed to check prosecutorial power.266 Prosecutorial
pretrial publicity can undermine—and even bias to the prosecution’s
favor—this essential check on prosecutorial power created in the
Constitution to protect individual life and liberty.
The prejudicial impact of pretrial publicity on juries in the criminal
justice system has been shown in numerous psychological studies and
empirical research.267 Studies show that the bias created by pretrial
263. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (Kennedy, J.).
264. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 17, at 1053 (“Prosecutors must balance the duty to
zealously represent the community with the constitutional duty to respect a defendant’s right to a
fair trial.”).
265. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004).
266. See Baradaran, supra note 176 (arguing the “jury acts ‘as a bulwark between the State and
the accused,’” prohibiting punishment until “‘the prosecution has proved each element of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2350–51));
see also Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82
N.C. L. REV. 621, 624 (2004) (noting that prosecutors possess “enormous power” to secure a
conviction or guilty plea from a defendant, and because defendants will “very likely be convicted”
of the crime charged, “[j]uries are one of the few remaining checks on this power of prosecutors”).
267. See Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et al., The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A
Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 219, 229–30 (1999) (performing a metaanalytic review of forty-four empirical studies involving 5,755 participants on the effects of pretrial
publicity on juries, and finding overall that “negative pretrial publicity significantly affects jurors’
decisions about the culpability of the defendant,” that “[j]urors exposed to publicity which presents
negative information about the defendant and crime are more likely to judge the defendant as guilty
than are jurors exposed to limited [pretrial publicity],” and that “the combination of data in this
meta-analysis has demonstrated a convergence of the evidence across method to the conclusion that
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publicity is generally pro-prosecution and against the accused. Empirical
studies have found that certain types of pretrial publicity have a statistically
significant prejudicial effect on juries. Examples include the following:
information regarding a prior criminal record of the accused,268 a
confession of the accused (even if retracted),269 results of tests implicating

pretrial publicity has a significant impact on juror decision making”); see also, e.g., Dennis J.
Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 688 (2001) (showing that juror bias induced by negative pretrial
publicity is not mitigated by jury deliberation, and may, in fact, be enhanced by that negative
publicity); Steven Fein et al., Can the Jury Disregard that Information? The Use of Suspicion to
Reduce the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity and Inadmissible Testimony, 23 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1215, 1215–16 (1997) (“Research has shown that jury verdicts can be
influenced by . . . pretrial publicity concerning the defendant, disclosure of his or her prior record,
current events in the news, incriminating testimony ruled inadmissible by the judge, hideous crimescene images, [and] clearly coerced confessions . . . .” (citations omitted)); Norbert L. Kerr et al.,
On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An
Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 695 (1991) (“Not unexpectedly, we found that exposure to
certain types of highly prejudicial pretrial publicity, including information concerning the
defendant’s prior record, the existence of incriminating physical evidence, and defendant’s
implication in another crime, did bias mock jury verdicts. Such publicity, therefore, can create a
threat to an impartial jury.”); Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors, 78
JUDICATURE 115, 124 (1994) (concluding that “there is considerable evidence that prejudicial
publicity can and does bias verdicts”); Christine Ruva et al., Effects of Pre-Trial Publicity and Jury
Deliberation on Juror Bias and Source Memory Errors, 21 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 45, 45
(2007) (finding that “[e]xposure to [pretrial publicity] significantly affected guilty verdicts, sentence
length, perceptions of defendant credibility, and misattributions of [pretrial publicity] as having
been presented as trial evidence”); Christine L. Ruva & Michelle A. LeVasseur, Behind Closed
Doors: The Effect of Pretrial Publicity on Jury Deliberations, 18 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 431, 442
(2012) (arguing that jurors who were exposed to negative pretrial publicity were significantly more
likely than their non-exposed counterparts to discuss ambiguous trial facts in a manner that
supported the prosecution’s case); Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity:
The Media, the Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 428, 433 (1997) (“[P]retrial
publicity has been found to influence evaluations of the defendant’s likability, sympathy for the
defendant, perceptions of the defendant as a typical criminal, pretrial judgments of the defendant’s
guilt, and final verdicts.”).
268. Kerr et al., supra note 267, at 695; Amy L. Otto et al., The Biasing Impact of Pretrial
Publicity on Juror Judgments, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 453, 465 (1994) (finding that prior criminal
record publicity “caused subjects to believe that the defendant was a ‘typical criminal,’” which in
turn was related to a final guilty verdict); see also Kerr, supra note 267, at 124; Joel D. Lieberman
& Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
677, 681 (2000) (“[P]rior record information indirectly influenced final verdicts by leading
participants to believe that the defendant was a ‘typical criminal.”’).
269. Kerr, supra note 267, at 124 (summarizing Padawer-Singer study with significant
prejudicial effect from publicity reporting a prior criminal record and “that the defendant had
retracted a confession”); Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 268, at 680–81 (summarizing Tans &
Chafee experimental study on pretrial publicity finding that “a police report of a confession was the
most damaging category of information”).
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the accused,270 inadmissible incriminating evidence,271 and statements
regarding the character of the accused.272 Such information has a
cumulative effect: the more of it an individual receives, the more likely she
is to adjudge the accused guilty.273
An “abundance of studies” show “that jurors who claim to be unbiased
are still influenced by pretrial publicity” and that an individual’s selfevaluation of impartiality—even when sincere—fails to correlate with
whether their opinion of guilt is in fact influenced by pretrial publicity.274
Indeed, once a person has made a prejudgment of guilt, they will actually
perceive trial evidence differently. Thus, researchers have found that
subjects who prejudged guilt because of pretrial publicity actually
interpreted the prosecution’s case as significantly stronger than subjects
who were not exposed to pretrial publicity.275 Further, emotional pretrial
publicity (meaning publicity arousing public passion but with no

270. See Otto et al., supra note 268, at 455 (noting that empirical studies have found that nonconfession inculpatory reports such as failed lie detector tests can influence juror judgments of
guilt).
271. See Kerr et al., supra note 267, at 673, 695 (discussing inadmissible incriminating
physical evidence as a subset of prejudicial pretrial publicity); Otto et al., supra note 268, at 464–65
(finding that inadmissible evidence influenced pretrial judgments of guilt, which “directly related to
final verdicts”).
272. Otto et al., supra note 268, at 464 (finding “[t]he strongest effects were for the negative
pretrial publicity about the defendant’s character,” but the study did not include confession by the
defendant).
273. See Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 268, at 680 (citing study by Tans & Chaffee showing
the cumulative effect of pretrial publicity against defendant); Gary Moran & Brian L. Cutler, The
Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 345, 349–55 (1991)
(field study of actual cases showed knowledge of the case from pretrial publicity “was positively
and significantly correlated with perceived culpability of the defendant but nonsignificantly
correlated with willingness to admit partiality”); Steblay et al., supra note 267, at 231 (“Multiple
indicators of a defendant’s ‘guilt’ (confession, prior record, incriminating evidence) produced an
increased effect on juror judgments of guilt . . . .”).
274. Leiberman & Arndt, supra note 268, at 683; Fein et al., supra note 267, at 1223 (finding
that pretrial publicity of inadmissible evidence biased mock juror’s verdicts despite “‘jurors’ selfreports of how little they were influenced by the inadmissible information”); Kerr, supra note 267,
at 125 (summarizing studies, including Sue, Smith & Pedroza’s study in which individuals exposed
to publicity who indicated their own ability to be impartial “were still much more likely to convict
than jurors never exposed to the publicity (53 percent guilty versus 23 percent guilty,
respectively)”); Moran & Culter, supra note 273, at 345, 349–55 (field study where exposure to
pretrial publicity “was positively and significantly correlated with perceived culpability of the
defendant,” but failed to correlate with the individuals’ self-assessments of impartiality).
275. Otto et al., supra note 268, at 463 (“Subjects who believed the defendant was guilty prior
to viewing the trial were more likely, after viewing the trial, [to] the think the evidence was
strong . . . .”); see also Steblay et al., supra note 267, at 231 (citing Moore’s study indicating “that
negative publicity provides not just isolated fragments of information, but a belief framework about
defendant culpability” and “[t]his biased schema then directs the juror’s attention and provides a
filter through which subsequent evidence is perceived” (emphasis added)).
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inculpatory information, such as graphic crime scene pictures276) has strong
prejudicial effects even when completely irrelevant to determining the guilt
of the accused.277
Despite the essential role of the jury in checking prosecutorial power
and the psychological literature showing prejudicial effects on juries, the
Supreme Court’s current case law makes it nearly impossible for a
defendant to obtain a reversal of a conviction based on a denial of a fair
trial because of prejudicial pretrial publicity. According to the Court:
“[P]retrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse publicity—does not
inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”278 Thus, prosecutors who fuel negative
pretrial publicity have very little to lose. If their pretrial publicity happens
to prejudice the jury to render a guilty verdict, the verdict usually will not
be overturned.
Unfortunately, a number of prosecutors engage in prejudicial pretrial
publicity. In a content analysis of media reports covering crimes in major
American news outlets, Dorothy J. Imrich, Charles Mullin, and Professor
Daniel Linz found that prejudicial information (defined as material
presumptively deemed prejudicial by MRPC 3.6) appeared in 27% of
media reports identifying criminal defendants.279 Importantly, the most
frequent source of such prejudicial information was law enforcement or the
prosecution.280 Although the majority of criminal defendants do not have to
face negative pretrial publicity, as Professor Norbert L. Kerr reports, “the
absolute number is not trivial (more than 12,000 per year in the United
States).”281
Although a conviction following such adverse pretrial publicity may not
be overturned as a violation of due process, under the access-to-justice
theory, states can nevertheless prohibit and punish prosecutors who engage
in prejudicial pretrial publicity that undermines the defendant’s chances for
an impartial jury.282 The prosecutor represents “a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
276. Kerr, supra note 267, at 123 (describing emotionally biasing publicity).
277. See Kerr et al., supra note 267, at 673–75 (describing an experiment in which jurors
convicted a defendant of armed robbery based on unrelated, emotional news reports of the
defendant’s involvement in a hit and run despite the fact that the news reports lacked any
appreciable evidentiary value).
278. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2916 (2010) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976)).
279. Dorthy J. Imrich et al., Measuring the Extent of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity in Major
American Newspapers: A Content Analysis, 45 J. COMM. 94, 94, 104, 106, and 112 (1995) (“Law
enforcement officers and prosecutors were most often the sources of potentially prejudicial
information about criminal suspects.”).
280. See id. at 94, 98, 104–05, 112–13.
281. Kerr, supra note 267, at 121.
282. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2014) (setting forth prohibitions
on lawyer pretrial extrajudicial statements); id. at R. 3.8(f) (setting forth limitations on extrajudicial
statements made by prosecutors specifically).
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at all.”283 It is part of the prosecutor’s role to ensure that the defendant
receives a fair trial with an impartial jury, and it is contrary to that role—
and a violation of the prosecutor’s duty to his government client—for the
prosecutor to engage in pretrial publicity that has been shown to undermine
juror impartiality against the accused. Under the access-to-justice theory,
prosecutors lack a First Amendment right to engage in speech that will
undermine the constitutional rights of the accused, the prosecutor’s own
role in the justice system, or the jury’s role as a check on prosecutorial
power in our constitutional criminal justice system. Thus, prosecutors can
constitutionally be forbidden from engaging in pretrial publicity that can
prejudice jury verdicts—especially publicity involving the specific
categories of highly prejudicial information that studies strongly indicate
can bias potential jurors.
The studies cited above illuminate a significant tension between the
accused’s right to an impartial jury and the First Amendment rights of the
press to report criminal cases.284 This Article does not address that
problem. While a “compromise” between competing constitutional values
may be appropriate when considering the accused’s right to a fair trial and
the media’s right to report under the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses,
yet, under the access-to-justice theory, there cannot and should not be a
“compromise” between the prosecutor’s free speech rights and the
accused’s fair trial rights. The prosecutor’s free speech rights are defined
by her role in the justice system. In acting on behalf of the State in
executing the full weight of its criminal powers against individuals to
deprive them of life or liberty, the prosecutor lacks any free speech right to
engage in pretrial publicity that undermines a criminal defendant’s fair
trial.
In arguing for broad rights for attorneys to engage in pretrial publicity,
Chemerinsky notes the existence of less restrictive alternatives to publicity
prohibitions, such as extensive voir dire, sequestration, change of venue,
and continuance.285 Nevertheless, Freedman and Starwood note that many
such “fixes” require the defendant to give up a different constitutional right
in order to regain a fair trial:
Apart from sequestration, the most effective alternatives for
avoiding the effects of prejudicial publicity are delaying the
trial, changing venue and trying the case before a judge
without a jury. Yet each of those alternatives involves the
forfeiture by the defendant of a right guaranteed by the sixth
amendment: the right to a speedy trial, the right to be tried in
283. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
284. Notably, the “English approach” to regulating media “accepts restricting the free flow of
information in order too protect the right of the accused to a fair trial.” See Giorgio Resta, Trying
Cases in the Media: A Comparative Overview, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 36–38 (2008).
285. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 879 (extrapolating from Nebraska Press).
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the state and district in which the crime was committed and
the right to trial by jury.286
The prosecutor—as the representative of the State and the person
exercising government power to deprive people of life and liberty—must
uphold these other constitutional rights of the accused.287
Moreover, psychological and empirical studies indicate that at least
some of these more modest remedies may be ineffectual at curbing pretrial
publicity.288 While a searching voir dire may help in cases involving very
limited publicity (such that all jurors exposed to any publicity may be
excused289), in cases where there is wide-spread publicity about a case, voir
dire does little if anything to curb prejudice created by publicity.290 Change
of venue may work if the publicity is localized so that exposed jurors are
no longer included in the venire—although in the age of the internet that
may become a diminishing reality. One study indicates that continuance
may be effective to dilute the prejudicial effect of factual pretrial publicity,
but not emotional pretrial publicity.291 Overall, there is considerable doubt
as to the effectiveness of these “less restrictive alternatives” in alleviating
286. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 617 (emphasis added); accord Matheson, supra
note 77, at 882 (arguing that the accused’s constitutional rights may still be endangered
notwithstanding the court’s use of alternatives to pretrial publicity restrictions).
287. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 617 (noting that the accused’s constitutional
rights—including her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial—serve as
limits to the prosecutor acting in official government capacity).
288. Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 267, at 439–46, 456 (1997) (reviewing research
regarding various methods and concluding that “traditional safeguards, such as continuances,
extended voir dire, jury deliberations, and judicial instructions to disregard the pretrial publicity or
use it under limited conditions have been found to be ineffective” at eliminating the bias created by
pretrial publicity).
289. See Kerr et al., supra note 267, at 700.
290. Norbert L. Kerr reports on one such study:
Jurors exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity who passed through the entire voir
dire gauntlet were no more or less likely to convict than those who were excused
(by anyone [judges, prosecutors, or defense attorneys]), but both groups were
significantly more likely to convict than jurors unexposed to the publicity. Thus,
the net effect of the voir dire process as simulated in this study was nil—the
biasing effect of exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity survived this voir dire
process unscathed.
Kerr, supra note 267, at 126 (emphasis added); see also Fein et al., supra note 267, at 1216
(“Research on mock jurors as well as actual juries has found that trial lawyers are generally unable
to use voir dire to eradicate the biasing effects of pretrial publicity . . . .”); Kerr et al., supra note
267, at 700 (finding “Our study . . . along with a number of other studies, suggests that confidence
in voir dire as an effective remedy for exposure to extensive, highly prejudicial pretrial publicity is
not warranted.” (footnote omitted)); Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 268, at 682 (reviewing studies
finding that attorneys are generally unsuccessful in their attempts to use voir dire to remove the
prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity).
291. Kerr et al., supra note 267, at 675.
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the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity.292 Consequently, the prosecution
should not be able to prejudice the jury venire in reliance on ineffectual fixes—
some of which may also deny the defendant of other constitutional rights.
B. The Role and Concomitant Speech Rights of the Criminal
Defense Attorney
The access-to-justice theory has particular force when it comes to
whether the criminal defense attorney should have a First Amendment
right to engage in pretrial publicity. The theory posits that there should be
protection for attorney speech that invokes or avoids government power in
the preservation of life, liberty, or property.293 The criminal defense
attorney’s role is to protect the defendant’s life, liberty, and property when
facing the full force of government power being brought against him.
The criminal defense attorney is thus the accused’s “champion against a
hostile world,”294 and she has heightened duties of loyalty, confidentiality,
communication, and zealous representation. As the ABA Defense Function
Standards explain, “included in defense counsel’s obligations to the client
is the responsibility of furthering the defendant’s interest to the fullest
extent that the law and the applicable standards of professional conduct
permit.”295 By protecting the rights of the accused and challenging the
prosecution, the defense counsel is “fulfilling a necessary and important
function” in the criminal justice system.296 In fact, “[t]he basic duty
defense counsel owes to the administration of justice and as an officer of
the court is to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage
and devotion and to render effective, quality representation.”297
The defense counsel’s duty to provide effective representation is
constitutionally mandated. The Sixth Amendment expressly provides that a
criminal defendant is to have “the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”298 Defense attorneys serve a constitutional function of checking
the State’s exertions of criminal power against individuals. As Justice
Kennedy observed in Gentile, “the criminal defense bar . . . has the
professional mission to challenge actions of the State.”299
292. As Studebaker and Penrod summarize: “[I]t appears that the effects of pretrial publicity
can find their way to the courtroom, can survive the jury selection process, can survive the
presentation of trial evidence, can endure the limiting effects of judicial instructions, and cannot
only persevere through deliberation, but may actually intensify.” Studebaker & Penrod, supra note
267, at 445.
293. See Tarkington, supra note 22, at 61.
294. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 11, at 20.
295. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-1.2 cmt., at 122 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution
_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf.
296. Id.
297. Id. § 4-1.2(b) (emphasis added).
298. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
299. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991) (Kennedy, J.).
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Indeed, all of the interests that cut against a prosecutor having a free
speech right to engage in pretrial publicity actually cut in favor of
recognition of that right for the criminal defense attorney because of her
constitutional role in challenging state power brought to bear against
individuals. Thus, a criminal defense attorney should have a protected right
to engage in pretrial publicity necessary to preserve the presumption of
innocence, to obtain a fair plea, to protect the reputational and liberty
interests of the accused, and to secure a fair trial.
1. Free Speech Right to Speak for the Accused
Because the criminal defense attorney represents an individual client—
unlike the prosecutor, who represents an amorphous government client—it
could be argued that the following interests only demonstrate that the
accused should have a free speech right to engage in pretrial publicity,
rather than the defense attorney on behalf of the accused. The accused
himself, of course, must have a First Amendment right to engage in pretrial
publicity in the face of criminal charges—a right not all courts have
recognized.300 It would undermine recognized and core purposes of the
First Amendment if the government could bring public criminal charges
against a person and could also deny that person the right to publicly
respond to those charges until and except in the venue of a trial conducted
by the government itself. Vincent Blasi argued that a primary purpose in
enacting the First Amendment was to check government power.301 Further,
under democratic theories of the First Amendment, the accused should be
able to subject the use of government criminal power to the scrutiny of the
ultimate sovereign in our system, the People302—including, as Justice
Kennedy argued in Gentile, “to demonstrate in the court of public opinion
that the [accused] does not deserve to be tried.”303 Finally, the accused
should have such a right as an essential component of preserving her own
liberty and status as a member of society.
300. See, e.g., State v. Grossberg, 705 A.2d 608, 614 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (issuing gag order
against criminal defendant forbidding her from making pretrial statements to the press in highprofile murder case). But see Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 642 (Haw. 1992) (reversing gag order
issued by trial court against criminal defendant).
301. Blasi, supra note 105, at 527, 538 (“[T]he most influential free-speech theorists of the
eighteenth century—those who drafted the First Amendment and their mentors—placed great
emphasis on the role free expression can play in guarding against breaches of trust by public
officials. Indeed, if one had to identify the single value that was uppermost in the minds of the
persons who drafted and ratified the First Amendment, this checking value would be the most likely
candidate.” (footnotes omitted)).
302. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
253–57 (explaining that “[a]ll constitutional authority to govern the people of the United States
belongs to the people themselves” and that while the people are “‘the governed,’” yet “in a deeper
sense” the people have “sovereign power” over the government to whom they have delegated
specific and limited powers).
303. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1043 (Kennedy, J.).
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Although recognizing the right of the accused to speak for herself is
essential, it is insufficient. The defense attorney must have his own free
speech right to speak in his official capacity on behalf of the accused.
Criminal defendants face the full weight of the government’s brute force
being brought against them to literally take away their lives and liberty. In
facing “what is so much stronger than themselves,”304 they are
constitutionally provided with the assistance of counsel—someone who
understands the law, defenses thereto, and the workings of the criminal
justice system. That counselor can use her legal expertise to ascertain the
rights of the accused and to declare to the public when the prosecution is
abusing its power. It is the role of the defense attorney to protect the life,
liberty, and property of the accused, and under the access-to-justice theory,
that includes protecting the client’s constitutional and legal interests
discussed herein, even through the medium of pretrial publicity.
Recognizing the right of the attorney to speak also helps to provide
parity between the public spokespersons for the prosecution and the
defense. The prosecution does not represent an individual with his own
speech rights; thus, the State speaks only through the prosecutor.
Statements made on behalf of the State, including in the indictment and
charging affidavit, are made by a professional who is trained in law,
speaking, reasoning, evidence, and the art of persuasion. Criminal
defendants, as a whole, are disproportionately poor and undereducated.305
They may be inarticulate (or less than fluent in English), or struggling with
mental-health issues. As Freedman and Smith note, “[i]t could be
disastrous . . . for an unskilled defendant to confront the cacophony and
confusion of a press conference.”306 Moreover, any statements that could
be interpreted as incriminating could be used against the accused at trial.307
It is essential for the accused to have an advocate who is categorically an
equal match with the State’s spokesman in education and training to
protect the accused’s interests.
In speaking on behalf of the defendant, however, the defense attorney is
not merely a public-relations specialist. The lawyer’s training in the law
and access to information regarding the case, including communications
with the defendant, enable the lawyer to make comments to the press that
are far more protective of the defendant’s legal rights than if they came
from another source—including from the defendant.308 A lawyer’s training
304. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
305. See Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the
Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 436 (2011) (noting that “most criminal defendants
are indigent”).
306. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 11, at 101–02.
307. See id. at 102.
308. See id. (“Defense counsel, by virtue of her knowledge about the case and her training as
an advocate, is frequently the most appropriate person to speak publicly on behalf of the
defendant.”).
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enables him to evaluate the justness of the charges brought by the
prosecution and any relevant defenses.309 This is particularly true in an age
in which laws are often complex and even the accused may not understand
the law’s requirements or the legal showing necessary to establish a
defense.
Importantly, the defense attorney cannot just begin revealing
information about the case without her client’s express or implied
consent.310 Without authorization, the defense attorney cannot reveal
confidential information, which includes all information relating to the
representation, whatever its source.311 Thus, it is important to recognize the
source of the defense attorney’s First Amendment right to engage in
pretrial publicity on behalf of her client. It is not because the information is
of public concern, is political speech, or is in a public record. Rather, the
criminal defense attorney has these speech rights under the access-tojustice theory because these rights are essential to fulfilling her role in the
criminal justice system to fully represent her client and protect her client’s
rights to life and liberty from government forfeiture. Indeed, the defense
attorney has speech rights sufficient not only to protect the client’s interests
in securing an ultimate fair trial—as emphasized in the traditional
compromise—but also to preserve the presumption of innocence, obtain a
fair plea, and protect the client’s reputation and liberty interests.
2. Free Speech Right to Reinforce the Presumption of Innocence
The presumption of innocence, as constitutionally grounded in the Due
Process Clauses and in the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial,
encompasses two underlying purposes, both of which are consistent with
(and even buttressed by) defense attorney pretrial publicity.312 First,
defense attorney pretrial publicity can act as a “shield against punishment
before conviction,” shoring up the presumption’s goal that the accused be
treated with the dignity accorded to all other presumably innocent people
in society.313 Upon publication of even the fact of an arrest or indictment,
pretrial publicity from the defense can remind the public that the
prosecution has yet to prove its case and that they should suspend
judgment until a jury has spoken. When faced with criminal charges
causing family, friends, and associates to treat the accused as guilty, the
309. See id.
310. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2014).
311. Id. (prohibiting, absent an applicable exception, lawyers from revealing information
“relating to the representation of a client” without informed consent or implied authorization); see
also id. at R. 1.6 cmt. [3] (noting that the professional duty of confidentiality is greater in breadth
than the attorney-client privilege because it “applies in situations other than those where evidence is
sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law” and to “all information relating to the
representation, whatever its source”).
312. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
313. Quintard-Morénas, supra note 167, at 107–08, 148.
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defense should be able to respond publicly to preserve the accused’s right
not to be subjected to punishment until a jury has found him proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Unfortunately, MRPC 3.6 only presumptively allows the defense
attorney to state the “defense involved.”314 Further, presumptively
prejudicial statements include statements regarding the evidence, forensic
tests, the character, lack of criminal record, and the innocence of the
accused.315 The defense attorney should not be limited to identifying the
defense, but should be able to elaborate on the defense, including
exculpatory evidence. Because the public is aware that an accused is
entitled to counsel, they may not give much weight to defense attorney
statements containing a vague reference to the existence of a defense. It is
imperative that the defense attorney be allowed to present the public with
exculpatory facts and elaborate on the defense. Such specific information
should have a greater impact on the public in presuming innocence until
trial because the public will understand that reserving judgment against the
accused is not merely a legal technicality, but may be justified in fact. Of
course, the presumption of innocence and the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by an impartial jury are in no way technicalities, but are the bedrock of
our criminal justice system and a constitutional reservation to the People of
the power of government to deprive individuals of life and liberty. Yet to
help the public understand the constitutional weight of the presumption,
defense attorneys need to be able to reinforce the presumption, including
by being free pretrial to elaborate on exculpatory evidence and defenses in
specific cases. Even though defense attorneys often may not wish to initiate
publicity, the fact that they do in some cases may serve on the whole to
reinforce the presumption of innocence for criminal defendants
collectively.
As Kitai explains, the presumption of innocence is part of the compact
between the individual and the State316 and it serves to lessen the friction
between the two in the face of criminal charges.317 Allowing the State (in
the form of lawyer regulation) to tell an accused that her constitutionally
provided counselor cannot speak publicly on her behalf, or explain why a
defense exists, or why charges should not be brought under law
exacerbates tensions between the accused and the State, thus undermining
the presumption’s salutary effects. The government must uphold the
presumption of innocence and should not be able to foreclose the defense
attorney from publicly questioning the propriety of criminal charges. The
State, through its prosecutor, has singled out the accused as a member of
society who allegedly deserves to lose her life or liberty. But the State’s
314.
315.
316.
317.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b) (2014).
Id. at R. 3.6 cmt. [5].
Kitai, supra note 166, at 281–82.
Id. at 282–83.
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power is limited by the presumption of innocence.318 Having brought
charges against an accused, the State should not be able to muzzle attempts
of the accused or his counselor to declare his innocence, to elaborate on his
defense, or to argue that charges are unwarranted.
Moreover, the defense attorney should be able to declare to the press
(when doing so is not a misrepresentation) her belief that the accused is
innocent. Such “vouching” for client innocence has been condemned by
some scholars319 and MRPC 3.6 includes as presumptively prejudicial “any
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal
case.”320 But where the defense attorney believes a client to be innocent or
to be unjustly charged, there is no state justification in forbidding the
attorney from stating so publicly. The attorney’s statements serve to bolster
the presumption of innocence. Again, the prosecution will be able to
respond to such statements, for example, by noting that it has evidence
sufficient to continue the prosecution. Nevertheless, in light of the
presumption of innocence, the prosecution lacks a free speech right to
vouch for the guilt of the accused because the prosecution, in representing
the State, must abide by the presumption.321 Although this approach is
facially unequal, continued prosecution itself implies evidence supporting
guilt,322 and the result is consistent with the presumption of innocence and
the differing roles of the prosecutor and the defense attorney in the criminal
justice system. Thus, MRPC 3.6’s limitation on vouching is an appropriate
limit on prosecutorial speech, but it violates the defense attorney’s free
speech rights.
Freedman and Starwood posit that “a situation in which a defendant
could generate publicity sufficient to prejudice the case against the
prosecution scarcely can be imagined.”323 While there are many possible
factors in play,324 the difficulty in prejudicing the prosecution exists in part
318. See id. at 280 (“The presumption protects the individual’s right of freedom within and
from the state.”).
319. See Cole & Zacharias, supra note 87, at 1665–72 (criticizing the use of vouching by
attorneys).
320. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [5] (2014) (noting that “any opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant or suspect in a criminal case” is more likely than not to
prejudice the proceeding).
321. See Kitai, supra note 166, at 279 (noting that the presumption of innocence reminds law
enforcement agencies that the defendant may actually be innocent, and that the presumption
therefore “forbids considering a person as guilty because of the existence of incriminating evidence
against her”).
322. See supra Section III.B.
323. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 607.
324. Differing access to major media outlets is a possible reason why the defense may not be
able to have as great an influence as the prosecution. In the age of the internet, some defense
attorneys, including the defense teams for George Zimmerman and for Bei Bei Shuai posted their
own publicity directly on their own websites and social media. See Hochberg, supra note 3; Free
Bei Bei Shuai, PENCEHENSEL.COM, http://www.pencehensel.com/Practice-Area-Overview/Criminal-
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because of the presumption of innocence. The trial is supposed to start with
the jury presuming that the defendant is innocent and with the prosecution
bearing a heavy burden to overcome that presumption.325 Thus, even if
jurors were to go into a trial inclined to think the defendant was innocent,
that would not undermine the legal presumption that is supposed to exist.
Defense pretrial publicity can also help ensure the second purpose of
the presumption of innocence, which is to establish the burden of proof for
the prosecution. Where pretrial publicity by the defense attorney works to
alleviate juror pro-prosecution bias—which at least one empirical study
supports326—it sustains the presumption of innocence in requiring the
prosecution to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Free Speech Right to Secure a Fair Plea
As noted by several commentators, criminal defense attorneys can be as
much of a problem, if not more, in securing fair pleas for their clients as
the prosecution. Often paid by case volume or flat fee, with many facing
enormous caseloads, they have strong economic incentives to encourage
their clients to plead rather than take cases to trial.327 Thus, many criminal
defense attorneys compound the prosecution’s pressure on defendants to
plead guilty regardless of the evidence in the case—indeed, the defense
attorney may not have or take the time to investigate the merits, defenses,
or anything at all about the matter before recommending a plea.328
Nevertheless, criminal defense attorneys should be able to speak to the
press to alleviate the inequities favoring the prosecution in the plea
bargaining process. One of the problems in plea bargaining is its secretive
nature.329 Where evidence is weak or defendants have a credible claim of
innocence, prosecutors can hide cases from public scrutiny with sweet
Defense/Free-Bei-Bei-Shuai.shtml (last visited May 24, 2014) (linking internet users to information
posted by Bei Bei Shuai’s defense attorneys on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter).
325. See Kitai, supra note 166, at 279 (“The presumption of innocence operates during trial to
shift the burden of proof onto the prosecution, who strives to refute it on a factual level.”).
326. See infra text accompanying notes 362–366.
327. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 200, at 2476–77 (providing that “flat fees create financial
incentives [for defense attorneys] to plead cases out quickly in order to handle larger volumes”);
Schulhofer, supra note 207, at 1988 (noting defense counsel’s “powerful financial incentives . . . to
settle as promptly as possible”). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in
Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180, 1204–05, 1263 (1975) (studying defense attorneys and
showing the overwhelming incentives that lead them to pressure defendants to plead).
328. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 200, at 2479–2482 (“[M]any public defenders are
overburdened. They handle hundreds of cases per year, far more than privately retained attorneys
do. This volume ordinarily means that pleas become the norm . . . . [and] overburdened defense
attorneys cannot spend enough time to dig up all possible defenses. The result is fewer pleabargaining chips and less favorable plea bargains.” (footnote omitted)).
329. See id. at 2475 (positing that plea bargaining represents a secret area of law, hidden from
public view).
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deals that make the cases go away330 and, in fact, still result in a “win” for
the prosecution’s record. Yet prosecutors are “a politically ambitious
bunch,” who are often beholden to an electorate and thus will care about
negative press they may receive.331 Where a defendant is charged who is
innocent, who has a strong defense, or who is significantly overcharged,
his attorney should be able to publicly state as much to the press. Such
publicity may put political pressure on the prosecution. The prosecution
does have a right to respond to such publicity,332 but where the evidence
and information indicates that a prosecution is unwarranted, publicity may
help pressure the prosecution to lower or drop charges.
A recent example may be found in the prosecution of Bei Bei Shuai,
who faced a potential sentence of forty-five to sixty-five years in prison
after being charged with murder and attempted feticide.333 Shuai, while
pregnant, ingested rat poison in a suicide attempt after her boyfriend left
her.334 A friend found Shuai and took her to the hospital where she gave
birth by Cesarean section but the baby died three days later.335 Linda
Pence, the attorney for Bei Bei Shuai undertook considerable publicity in
Shuai’s behalf, including creating a website, a Facebook page, a Tumblr
page, and a Twitter account.336 Included on Pence’s website was an
invitation to the public to express their dissatisfaction with the charges to
the prosecutor, complete with a link to the prosecutor’s office address and
phone number.337 Shuai eventually pled guilty to criminal recklessness, a
misdemeanor, and was given credit for her entire sentence of 178 days.338
Although it is impossible to know whether the defense attorney’s publicity
influenced the prosecutor in deciding to offer the plea, it may have. The
issue is whether the defense attorney should have a constitutionally
protected speech right to freely engage in such publicity on behalf of a
defendant. As an attorney, Pence was able to frame the issues in a way to
protect Shuai’s interests,339 to note Shuai’s lack of criminal history, and to
330. See id. at 2473.
331. Id. at 2472 (“Most district attorneys are elected, and many have parlayed their
prosecutorial successes into political careers.”).
332. See infra Section IV.D.
333. See Free Bei Bei Shuai, supra note 324.
334. Id.; Diana Penner, Woman Freed after Plea Agreement in Baby’s Death, USA TODAY,
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/02/woman-freed-after-pleaagreement-in-babys-death/2614301/.
335. See Penner, supra note 334.
336. See Free Bei Bei Shuai, supra note 324.
337. Id. (explaining to online readers that they “can also write a letter to or call the
Prosecutor’s Office to show [their] support for Bei Bei and ask for her charges to be dropped before
trial”).
338. See Penner, supra note 334.
339. For example, Pence did not state or imply on her website that the rat poison was the cause
of death. Indeed, Pence successfully undermined the prosecution’s cause of death evidence. See
Free Bei Bei Shuai, supra note 324. The prosecutor noted in interviews about the plea that rulings
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elaborate on the applicable law and precedent that could be set by a
conviction in the case.340
Kevin Cole and Fred Zacharias have argued that defense attorney
pretrial publicity—especially publicity vouching for a defendant’s
innocence—can influence a prosecutor to offer a better deal to avoid
continued negative publicity.341 Nevertheless, they express concern that if
such pretrial publicity (even if true) is allowed to help one defendant, then
other defendants would expect the attorney to engage in the same speech
on their behalf. Thus, clients who were guilty would be faced with a
dilemma: to tell their attorney all of the facts and foreclose vouching, or to
lie to their lawyer so that she will vouch for their innocence.342 Further,
Cole and Zacharias argue that if vouching is allowed, then a defense
counsel’s failure to vouch for a client might lead to prejudicial
consequences such as negative inferences drawn by the public and the
potential jury pool or signals to prosecutors about the relative guilt of the
client.343
Despite such concerns, the alternative—foreclosing such pretrial
publicity—is unacceptable. It would contravene the role of the defense
attorney and his duties to the accused if he were prohibited from publicly
declaring the innocence of his client when the declaration was true and
would likely operate to the client’s benefit in obtaining a fair plea or
getting charges dropped altogether. As noted, plea bargaining is
significantly skewed in favor of the prosecution, which is able to exert
considerable pressure on the defendant to plead.344 The defense has close
to zero ability to pressure the prosecution to advance an equitable plea deal
or reduce or drop charges.345 Because it is the essential role of the defense
attorney to protect the life and liberty of the criminal defendant in the face
of the full weight of government power, the defense attorney cannot be
prohibited from using one of the few tools he has to exert pressure on a
politically-accountable prosecution: public opinion.

from the court had hurt their case, including that “Dr. Jolene Clouse, who performed the autopsy on
newborn Angel Shuai, didn’t consider other possible causes for the brain bleeding that caused her
death, including a drug that Shuai received while she was in the hospital.” Bei Bei Shuai Pleads
Guilty in Baby’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/08/02/bei-bei-shuai-guilty_n_3698383.html.
340. Free Bei Bei Shuai, supra note 324.
341. Cole & Zacharias, supra note 87, at 1648.
342. Id. at 1665–66.
343. Id. at 1665.
344. See supra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.
345. See Alschuler, supra note 327, at 1179–80 (positing that the romantic conception of the
defense attorney in the plea bargaining process as an “equalizer” is often “more romanticized than
real” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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It is a well-established fact that some innocent individuals plead
guilty.346 If a prosecutor brings unjustified charges, the defense attorney
should be able to publicly call the prosecutor on it. Not only does this serve
to protect that individual criminal defendant’s interests, it also may serve to
bring to light the fact that the prosecutor is not exercising her discretion
appropriately. Such public scrutiny may in turn improve the integrity of
prosecution. One major concern regarding the plea bargaining system is
that it is done in the dark and prosecutors are able to “cover up faulty
investigations that mistakenly target innocent suspects.”347 If prosecutors
are aware that they are likely to receive negative publicity for unwarranted
or substantially overcharged indictments, they may exercise greater care in
ensuring that charges are warranted.348
But the fears of Cole and Zacharias that every criminal defendant will
want such publicity and will expect their attorneys to vouch for their
innocence to the press are unlikely to materialize. As discussed more fully
below, under the access-to-justice theory, once the defense opens the door,
the prosecution has a right to respond to the electorate and explain the
decision to charge and the evidence that supports that charge. The right of
the prosecution to respond (but not to initiate) publicity creates a
disincentive for defendants to initiate publicity themselves. Only
defendants who have little or no reason to fear publicity from the
prosecution explaining the evidence against them would find defense
attorney “vouching” useful to their cases. But if the defendant is innocent
or is grossly overcharged, then the chance of a successful response from
the prosecutor is not as big a threat. In such a case, if the prosecutor
responds by disclosing weak evidence, the defense can explain why the
prosecution’s response is unavailing. Ultimately this may help both sides to
properly determine the value of a case, resulting in a fairer plea bargain.
Indeed, tying into the prior subsection, the presumption of innocence is
intended not only to help society reserve judgment against the accused, but
also to help the prosecution reserve judgment through a constant reminder
that the accused might ultimately be found innocent at trial.349 Now that
most cases are not tried, the presumption often will not have that same
weight for the prosecution. But pretrial publicity from the defense that
reinforces the presumption of innocence can provide a pretrial check on
prosecutorial overconfidence in the strength of the case against the
accused, and thus bolster the chance of a fair plea.

346. See, e.g., supra note 227 and accompanying text.
347. Bibas, supra note 200, at 2473.
348. See id. at 2472 (noting that prosecutors are “particularly concerned about their
reputations” and respond to public pressures and incentives).
349. See Kitai, supra note 166, at 279–80.
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4. Free Speech Right to Preserve Client Reputation and Liberty
In discussing the social value of pretrial publicity, Chemerinsky notes
the importance of attorney’s protection of their clients’ reputations because
“[a] client who is never prosecuted, or who is prosecuted and acquitted,
may have been ill-served by a lawyer who allowed public speculation
about his guilt to go unchallenged.”350 The defense attorney has the ability
to challenge, as a matter of both law and fact, the legal appropriateness of
pressing charges. Notably, Chemerinsky does not make this observation as
part of his First Amendment analysis. Yet under the access-to-justice
theory, the defense attorney’s free speech rights include speech necessary
to her role in protecting her client’s reputation in the face of criminal
charges.
The existence of the common law tort of defamation shows the
enduring societal recognition of the value of reputation and its timehonored status as a legally protected interest. Nevertheless, when criminal
charges are brought against an individual, the prosecution is cloaked with
immunity and the individual cannot sue the prosecutor for defamation to
protect his reputation.351 While it is necessary to protect the prosecutor in
publishing charges in an indictment, such protection also means that the
accused is left bereft of a traditional remedy to protect her reputation in the
face of a publication that would generally be defamatory if untrue and if it
had been published in a different scenario.352 Consequently, once indicted,
the defendant and her constitutionally mandated counsel can timely salvage
the reputation of the accused before family, friends, and associates only
through a response to the charges. The defendant should not be forced to
wait until trial (months or years later) to protect her reputation. To require
such a delay would allow the government to deprive the accused of
reputation during the pretrial period—with resultant personal and
professional harms, but without any remedy. Although the accused and her
counsel may decide that waiting until trial is the wisest course, they should
have a right to protect the accused’s reputational interests promptly,
publicly, and forcefully if they deem it necessary or desirable.
Thus, it was perfectly consistent with his role as a defense attorney for
Gentile to hold a press conference to protect his client’s reputation and
property interests once Sanders was indicted.353 Gentile recognized the
severe reputational harm that his client, Sanders, had already suffered due
to publicity regarding the crime. Although a jury ultimately acquitted
350. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 869 (alteration in original) (quoting Uelman, supra note
85, at 951–52).
351. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
352. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 617 (stating that the prosecutor is specially
privileged “to go beyond the bounds that normally restrict other citizens by publishing charges in an
indictment that might otherwise constitute defamation”).
353. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991) (Kennedy, J.).
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Sanders on all counts,354 Sanders’s personal and professional life was on a
ruinous trajectory.355 A defense attorney is not required to await trial to
publicly counter the disastrous array of personal and professional harms
that come with indictment against her client.
Under the access-to-justice theory, because it is the central role of the
defense attorney to protect the accused’s life, liberty, and property interests
(which liberty interests include reputation), the attorney has a free speech
right to engage in pretrial publicity to protect her client’s reputational
interests pretrial. Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a
constitutional remedy for reputational harm absent a showing of “stigmaplus,”356 that does not undermine the importance of reputation as an
essential component of a person’s actual liberty interests. Reputation
directly affects a person’s ability to live as a free member of society—free
to work, associate with others, and live, as Attorney François QuintardMorénas argues, “with the dignity and respect due to presumably innocent
individuals.”357
In an era where pretrial detention has become common,358 pretrial
publicity from the defense may not only protect the client’s reputation, it
may actually help bring about a plea or dismissal that would put an end to
the accused’s pretrial detention. Thus, the attorney would not only be
protecting the accused’s liberty interests in reputation, but his liberty
interests in being free from unlawful or unjustified incarceration. As noted,
the framers considered freedom from unlawful restraint of special
importance in our constitutional justice system.359
5. Free Speech Right to Protect a Fair Trial
A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury is not a formality, but an essential populist check on the government’s
power to deprive people of life and liberty. Although few criminal cases
proceed to trial, the right to a trial exists in every case up until there is a
plea waiving that right. As noted above, empirical studies on pretrial
publicity indicate that publicity generally works in favor of the prosecution
and against the defense.360 Even emotional publicity of no inculpatory
value has been shown to prejudice mock juries against the accused.361
Notably, one empirical study indicated that pro-defense publicity can
354. Id.
355. See id. at 1040 (noting that after the media reports, Sanders’ company “suffered heavy
losses as customers terminated their box rentals, and the company soon went out of business”).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 250–54.
357. Quintard-Morénas, supra note 167, at 148.
358. See Baradaran, supra note 174, at 725.
359. See supra Section III.A.
360. See supra notes 273–75 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 276–77 and accompanying text.
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lessen the effects of pro-prosecution pretrial publicity.362 In that study, a
control group was exposed to no publicity and all other participants were
exposed to pro-prosecution publicity.363 Some of the exposed participants
were additionally exposed to a brief article where the defense attorney
questioned the motives of the press and the prosecution, indicating that the
prior reports “knowingly ignore[] facts which would point toward a
defendant’s innocence” and that the prosecution was trying to “sway public
opinion.”364 Interestingly, a minority of subjects in the no-publicity group
voted guilty (indicating the weakness of the mock-prosecution’s case), yet
more than 75% of the subjects who were solely exposed to the proprosecution publicity voted guilty.365 Finally, those who were exposed to
the pro-defense publicity “were no more likely to convict than were the
participants in the no-publicity control condition.”366 Thus, the pro-defense
publicity (and its implication of innocence) did not prejudice the group in
favor of the defendant; rather, it leveled the playing field back to what it
had been prior to the pro-prosecution publicity. Although this is only one
study on the effect of pro-defense publicity, it illustrates that pro-defense
publicity may be able to level the playing field for the defense, and restore
the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Because the role of the defense attorney includes protecting the
accused’s right to a fair trial, he should have a speech right to use publicity
to lessen prejudice for a client publicly charged with wrongdoing. Even
were we to imagine a situation where defense pretrial publicity resulted in
a jury that was predisposed to find the defendant innocent,367 that
“presumption of innocence” would not run contrary to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system. As noted, the presumption of
innocence is in part grounded in the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.368
MRPC 3.6 undermines the free speech rights of criminal defense
attorneys to protect the fair trial rights of their clients. The rule, as
elaborated in the comments, presumptively forbids lawyers from
commenting on “the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record” of
the accused or a witness, “the expected testimony of a party or witness,” or
the results of forensic tests.369 While the prosecution appropriately can be
foreclosed from publicizing negative character evidence, the criminal
362. Fein et al., supra note 267, at 1218.
363. Id. at 1218–19.
364. Id. at 1219 (internal quotation marks omitted).
365. Id.
366. Id.(emphasis added).
367. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 607 (arguing that such a scenario could scarcely
be imagined).
368. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
369. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. [5] (2014).
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record of the accused, and forensic test results,370 the “equality” of
imposing these same prohibitions on the defense is problematic. If the
defense has witnesses or forensic test results that undermine the
prosecution’s case, and if the defense wants to use that information to
publicly counter the weight of charges or level the playing field in public
opinion, they should be able to do so. Further, if the defense wants to
present to the press positive evidence regarding the character, lack of
criminal record, or reputation of the accused, the defense should be able to
do so in order to preserve all of the interests noted herein: a fair trial, a fair
plea, the presumption of innocence, and the liberty and pretrial reputation
of the accused.
If the defense commented on any of these items, as discussed below, the
prosecution would be able to respond with information necessary to
counter the publicity. Through this mechanism, not only are the fair trial
rights of the defendant preserved, but the other related constitutional rights
of the defendant are properly put into the defendant’s own hands.
Commentators have argued that the effects of pretrial publicity can be
fixed by other mechanisms, many of which require the defendant to give
up a different constitutional right (speedy trial, venue, and jury trial) to
regain a fair trial.371 Under the access-to-justice theory, the Constitution
permits limiting the prosecution from initiating most publicity; thus
extensive attorney publicity should only be generated if the defense
pursues it first. Consequently, if such publicity ultimately required one of
the above fixes (and the concomitant forfeiture of one of the defendant’s
rights) it would often be because the defense pursued that option.
Freedman and Starwood initially endorsed this approach, noting that if the
defendant or her counsel’s speech “should boomerang and result in so
much prejudicial publicity that the defendant must waive one or more sixth
amendment rights, so be it.”372 Defense counsel and the accused could
weigh such potential consequences prior to initiating publicity.
C. Constitutional Limitations on Attorney Pretrial Publicity
Under the access-to-justice theory, prosecutors have extremely limited
First Amendment rights to engage in pretrial publicity. They have a
constitutional right to engage in publicity that is necessary to fulfill their
purpose in the system of justice and have no constitutionally protected
right to undermine the criminal justice system, including the rights of the
accused, through pretrial publicity. Thus, they have a free speech right to
engage in publicity that is truly necessary to conduct the investigation,
prosecution, and trial. Consequently, restrictions like those found in the
CFR are constitutional, and could be constitutionally imposed on state
370. See id.
371. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 10, at 617.
372. Id.
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prosecutors, as Levenson proposes.373 Again, this does not mean that states
are required to restrict prosecutors to the fullest extent that the Constitution
allows. States are free to continue with lesser restrictions on prosecutorial
speech, but the Constitution is not a barrier to state regulations that would
foreclose prosecutors from engaging in pretrial publicity beyond what is
necessary to conduct the investigation, prosecution, and trial.
Further, prosecutors do not have a constitutional right to divulge all
information contained in public records. MRPC 3.6 contains a public
record exception allowing for such disclosures, but the CFR does not allow
disclosure of materials on the basis that the information is contained in a
public record.374 The Model Rules’ public record exception has been
interpreted in ways that generally swallow much of the force of the rule’s
overall limitation on pretrial publicity, even as to presumptively prejudicial
materials.375 For example, in Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland
v. Gansler,376 the prosecutor avoided discipline under Rule 3.6 by invoking
the public records exception when he published the prior criminal record of
an accused based on the argument that criminal records are contained in
public court records.377 As noted above, the prior criminal record of an
accused is one of the categories of pretrial publicity that has been found to
prejudice jurors against the defendant and undermine his rights.378 It is
contrary to the role of the prosecutor to inject such information into the
public view. It may be that media sources are able to dig up the
information, but it should not come from the prosecutor whose role
includes protecting the accused’s constitutional rights.
The constitutionality of restrictions on attorney disclosure of matters
that are of public record is not limited to this context. Attorneys of
individual clients are not constitutionally privileged to release information
relating to the representation of a client in violation of the duty of
confidentiality just because it is a matter of public record somewhere.
Rather, they are forbidden from undermining their client’s interests
373. See supra text accompanying notes 89–91.
374. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b) (2014) (allowing lawyers to
publicize “information contained in a public record”), with 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(3) (2013)
(containing no provision that would allow for the release of information relating to a criminal
proceeding on the basis that it is contained in a public record).
375. See, e.g., Muex v. State, 800 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding there was no
violation of Rule 3.6 by publicizing forensic results of inculpatory DNA tests because they were
included in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, a public record); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md.
v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 566–68 (Md. 2003) (reasoning there was no violation of Rule 3.6 for
public disclosure of a defendant’s criminal record based on the “broadest” construction of the
phrase “information in a public record”).
376. 835 A.2d 548 (Md. 2003).
377. Id. at 568. The court noted that future attorneys “will have the burden of establishing that
such information was contained in a bona fide public court record accessible to the general public,”
but that many criminal records could be found in “publicly accessible court records.” Id.
378. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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through such a disclosure.379 In a similar vein, the prosecutor can
constitutionally be prohibited from undermining the constitutional rights of
the accused—even if the prosecutor can find some public record that
contains the information. States are free to continue to have a public
records exception, but it is not constitutionally required, and the CFR’s
lack of a public records exception is constitutional.
Defense attorneys have strong First Amendment rights to engage in
pretrial publicity to protect their clients’ interests in a fair trial, a fair plea,
reputation, and liberty. They have a right to fully elaborate on the defense,
including discussing publicly any exculpatory evidence, testimony,
forensic tests, and the character, criminal record, and reputation of the
accused. Consistent with their role in and the purposes of the criminal
justice system, defense attorneys do have one significant limitation on their
speech, which is reflected in both MRPC 4.1 and 8.4. In her speech to the
press, the defense attorney lacks a First Amendment right to knowingly
“make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person”380 or to
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”381 MRPC 4.1, as proffered here as the constitutional
limitation, only prohibits the “knowing” false or misleading statement—
requiring “‘actual knowledge of the fact in question,’ which ‘may be
inferred from circumstances.’”382 Such a limitation, although similar, is
more restrictive than Chemerinsky’s recommendation of adopting
Sullivan’s actual malice standard, under which the state would be required
to prove that the attorney subjectively entertained doubts as to the truth of
the statements.383 Under MRPC 4.1, the lawyer must know that the
statements are false or materially misleading, but knowledge can be
inferred by the circumstances. Even so, it leaves great leeway for criminal
defense attorneys to engage in pretrial publicity, as long as they do not
engage in blatant misrepresentations and falsehoods.384

379. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3] (2014) (providing that Rule
1.6(a)’s bar on disclosing information relating to the representation of the client applies “to all
information relating to the representation, whatever its source”).
380. Id. at R. 4.1.
381. Id. at R. 8.4 (including in the definition of misconduct, any “conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”).
382. See BENNETT et al., CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 57, § 4.1 annot. (quoting
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2014)).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 73–76.
384. The overlap of MRPCs 4.1 and 8.4 with pretrial publicity already exists under the rules.
For example, in Iowa Sup. Ct. Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376, 383 (Iowa
2001), the court held that the attorney had not violated an Iowa professional ethics rule similar to
MRPC 3.6 by his publicity, but that he had nevertheless engaged in dishonest conduct in violation
of an Iowa ethics rule congruent to MRPC 8.4 because he knew that part of what he said was
untrue.
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D. Gentile’s Equality Principle and the Right to Respond
Even in a regime where prosecutors have limited free speech rights and
defense attorneys have robust free speech rights, Gentile’s equality
principle does have play in one very important sense. Once the defendant
opens the door by engaging in pretrial publicity, the prosecution should be
constitutionally privileged to respond to such statements. The prosecutor
represents a sovereign that is required to act impartially. Moreover, the
sovereign’s objectives in exercising its criminal powers must include
complying with constitutional requirements in the conviction of the guilty
while sparing the innocent.385 To the extent that a defense attorney’s
statements indicate that the prosecutor—as the representative of the
sovereign—is abusing that power, the prosecutor has a right to respond.
Further, prosecutors are political actors, using government resources, and
exercising political discretion under public scrutiny.386 It is part of the
prosecutor’s role to protect the interests of the government, and it is not in
the government’s interests for the public solely to hear (and come to
believe) that prosecutions lack justification when, in fact, that is not the
case.
A right to respond is already found in MRPC 3.6(c), and, as with that
provision, the prosecutor’s constitutional right to respond is “limited to
such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse
publicity.”387 It does not give the prosecution carte blanche to publicize all
information and opinions about the case. Further, as with defense
attorneys, the prosecution’s response must comport with MRPCs 4.1 and
8.4. Under the access-to-justice theory, the prosecution has no free speech
right to engage in false statements, misrepresentations, or dishonesty.
While defense publicity opens the door to prosecutorial response, it does
not suddenly enable the prosecution to “strike foul” blows388 that would
dishonestly and unjustly work to undermine all of the interests discussed
above—including the presumption of innocence, a fair plea, a fair trial, and
the reputational interests of the accused.
Moreover, under the access-to-justice theory, there is one area where
the prosecution can respond, but can be prohibited from responding “in
kind”—vouching for a client’s innocence or guilt. While a defense attorney
can vouch for her client’s innocence, if the statement is not a knowing
misrepresentation, the prosecution cannot vouch for the guilt of the
accused pretrial. To provide such a constitutional right to the prosecution
pretrial is directly contrary to the presumption of innocence.389 The
385. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
386. See Bibas, supra note 200, at 2472 (noting the political ambition of prosecutors).
387. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (2014).
388. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (explaining that while a prosecutor “may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones”).
389. See supra Subsection IV.A.2.
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prosecutor can, however, respond with information that mitigates defense
vouching, and the very fact of continued prosecution of the accused will
signal to the public the prosecution’s continued belief in the defendant’s
guilt.
The criminal defense team that decides to use publicity to protect the
accused’s interests in reputation, the presumption of innocence, a fair plea,
and a fair trial, must make that decision with proverbial fear and trembling.
Once they open the publicity door, the prosecution will be privileged to
respond. The defense must contemplate the reality that more publicity
generally works to favor the prosecution,390 and thus publicity can backfire
to harm the interests of the accused. When Zimmerman’s defense attorneys
decided to create a webpage, Facebook page, and Twitter account,
commentators recognized the significant risks for the defense in fueling
publicity, including through social media. One attorney commentator aptly
remarked: “‘You have to . . . understand that you’re playing with a monster
that will devour you if you screw up.’”391
Admittedly, publicity as to a particular crime or a particular defendant
or victim may bring intense media scrutiny without initiation from either
the prosecution or the defense. In such a case, the defense, of course,
maintains the right to initiate publicity of its own; and if they do so, the
prosecution has a right to respond in mitigation. Nevertheless, the
prosecution has no right to respond to publicity not coming from the
defense unless the media reports significantly undermine the prosecution’s
case. Under the access-to-justice theory, the prosecution lacks a free speech
right to use media interest in a crime as an excuse to fuel the fire of
publicity harmful to an accused.
The access-to-justice theory, thus, gives the accused the choice to either
close down nearly all publicity coming from the prosecution by refusing
themselves to engage in publicity or, alternatively, to engage the press and
allow the prosecution to respond. Putting this choice in the hands of the
defense is appropriate in our criminal justice system in light of the
constitutional mandates intended to safeguard the citizenry from abuse of
criminal power, the constitutional undergirding of the presumption of
innocence, and the reputational and liberty interests of the accused.
The rejection of differing free speech rights for the prosecution and
defense—as argued by Freedman and Starwood in 1977—has mostly
arisen from Gentile’s equality principle.392 That principle is founded on the
First Amendment prohibition against viewpoint-based restrictions.393 The
390. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
391. Hochberg, supra note 3 (quoting Scott Greenfield, a New York attorney and blogger).
392. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
393. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384–88 (1992) (explaining the
rationale that government is prohibited by the First Amendment from “driv[ing] certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace” (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
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primary objection to viewpoint-based restrictions is that they distort public
debate and knowledge by allowing the public to hear only one side of an
issue.394 Distortion of public debate is arguably more problematic when it
involves government processes, such as the workings of the criminal
justice system.
However, the alleged viewpoint-discrimination problem is illusory.
First, under the access-to-justice theory, once the defense attorney opens
the door to publicity, the prosecutor can respond. Thus, it is not accurate to
say that this approach is viewpoint discrimination. The public is never
given only the defense version without the prosecution having a right to
tell their side of the same story.
More importantly, even before the prosecution responds, allowing the
defense to engage in pretrial publicity is not one-sided. The government
has made the most devastating public statement possible about the accused
by officially declaring him a wrongdoer and seeking forfeiture of his life or
liberty through the indictment. That indictment, along with the charging
affidavit, may contain the most damaging information that can be disclosed
regarding that individual. Thus, any publicity from the defense is already a
“response” to the prosecution itself.
The ABA asserted a related argument in rejecting Freedman and
Starwood’s approach, namely the “general presumption in the adversarial
system [that] rules appl[y] equally to both sides.”395 This argument
similarly lacks merit. Under the access-to-justice theory of the First
Amendment, considerations about the proper functioning of the adversary
system are relevant when examining free speech rights. Where both parties
categorically are likely to have equal incentives, powers, and rights (as
exist in the civil context), then equal rules may be appropriate. But a
criminal prosecution does not involve two sides with categorically similar
incentives to engage in pretrial publicity, equal power to impose harms and
costs on the other, or equal interests at stake.396 The prosecution does not
represent an individual client whose life or liberty is being threatened in
the proceeding or whose reputation and livelihood could be devastated by
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))); Police Dep’t. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–98
(1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
394. See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (“Any restriction on expressive activity because of its
content would completely undercut the ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
395. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 8-1.1(b) cmt., at
6–7 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_
justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_standards_fairtrial.authcheckdam.pdf.
396. See Zacharias, supra note 209, at 1133–34 (discussing, in the context of plea bargaining,
the coercive relationship between the prosecution and the defendant, noting that “[t]he
prosecution . . . can exercise coercion unilaterally” and the “defendant can do nothing in response”).
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publicity; the defense does. The defense cannot impose any harm on the
prosecutor or her client; but the prosecutor selects the severity of the
charges and can seek pretrial detention. Importantly, the defense attorney’s
publicity can also protect several constitutionally mandated interests—a
fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and due process—while similar
publicity from the prosecution could undermine those same interests. It is
thus constitutionally justifiable to treat them differently, especially where it
will not result in viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, this would not be
the only area where, in light of the constitutional rights of the criminal
defendant (such as the right against compelled self-incrimination), the
prosecution is foreclosed from speech until the defense opens the door and
makes the prosecution’s speech an appropriate response.397
The ABA additionally argues that recognizing a strong right for the
defense and extremely limited rights for the prosecution would “[g]iv[e]
one side a preferred position with respect to extrajudicial statements,”
which “would tend to encourage that side to exploit its advantage.”398 But,
as noted, the prosecution begins with an advantage (the indictment) and
has power to coerce and harm the defendant. Giving the defense a free
speech right to counter this advantage works to level the playing field.
Further, the defense has inherent incentives to limit pretrial publicity. Once
the door is opened, the prosecutor can respond with information that may
embarrass the defendant, indicate guilt, or arouse public passion to the
detriment of the accused. Many people charged with a crime will not want
this kind of publicity, and if they can avoid it, they will.399 Thus,
knowledge of the prosecution’s right to respond curbs the defense
attorney’s inclinations to ever open that door, rather than creating an
“exploitable” advantage. Recognizing strong defense attorney rights to
initiate publicity should not lead to a parade of horribles in most cases, nor
to even the signaling spiral race-to-the-bottom that Margulies predicts.400
In contrast to the defense, the prosecution has no inherent incentives to
limit pretrial publicity, and publicity will generally work in its favor both
for its political goals and in influencing the jury venire. Giving the
prosecution rights to speech equal to those of the defense results in one of
two undesirable regimes: either (1) the defense will have free speech rights
397. If a criminal defendant does not testify at trial, the prosecution is prohibited from raising
certain evidence, including the criminal record of the defendant. However, if the defendant testifies,
the prosecution can enter evidence to impeach the credibility of the defendant, such as a criminal
record. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (permitting the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s prior
criminal conviction for purposes of impeachment).
398. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 8-1.1 cmt., at 7
(3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_jus
tice _section_newsletter/crimjust_standards_fairtrial.authcheckdam.pdf.
399. Matheson, supra note 77, at 884–85 (noting the devastating effect on the defendant’s
reputation when it is published that the defendant committed a crime).
400. See supra Section I.D.
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appropriate to their role and the prosecution will have equal rights allowing
the prosecution to undermine the defendant’s rights to fair trial, her
reputation, and the presumption of innocence; or (2) the prosecution will
be limited in its rights to speech, and the defense will not be able to contest
pretrial the full weight of government condemnation. MRPC 3.6 can be
seen as a compromise of these two undesirable alternatives, forged from a
desire to create an equal standard: the defense is deprived of much of its
free speech rights and the prosecution is somewhat restricted in its speech,
but is still allowed considerable leeway (particularly through the public
records exception, which the prosecution can manipulate by including
information they wish to publicize in the indictment or charging affidavit).
Unfortunately, this regime results in the worst of both worlds. The
prosecution can generally initiate publicity regarding a case and has no
inherent or structural disincentive to do so, thereby undermining the rights
of the accused. Yet the defense, unable to curb prosecutorial publicity, can
only engage in limited pretrial publicity, which may be insufficient to
protect the accused’s interests. The result is completely backwards; it
inspires prosecutorial publicity without appropriately protecting the free
speech rights of the defense.
The Supreme Court’s insistence in Gentile on employing the same rules
for the prosecution and the defense is misguided. Rather than creating a
viewpoint-neutral regime, MRPC 3.6 undermines the free speech rights of
criminal defense attorneys to protect their clients’ rights to a fair trial, to
reinforce the presumption of innocence, to secure a fair plea, and to protect
the defendant’s reputation and liberty. Moreover, in light of the
government’s public statement of charges and the prosecution’s right to
respond, the recognition of strong defense rights is not viewpoint-based
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, the social
compact between the individual and the State—these are among the
weighty interests in our criminal justice system that can be bolstered or
undermined through attorney pretrial publicity. The procedural protections
that exist in the Constitution for criminal justice are neither technicalities
nor formalities. Rather, they are indicative of the inestimable value of life
and liberty, and they act as a “bulwark between the State and the
accused”401—protecting the personal liberties of the individual from state
overreaching and forfeiture.
The traditional “compromise” of these interests is unnecessary to give
the First Amendment rights of lawyers their proper scope. Unfortunately,
the compromise of MRPC 3.6 and Gentile has failed to produce the fair
401. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351 (2012).
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and equal regime it aimed at creating. Instead, the compromise violates the
speech rights of defense lawyers to protect their clients’ rights to a
presumption of innocence, a fair plea, and a fair trial. The compromise also
improperly creates false constitutional walls that have kept states from
curbing their own representatives—prosecutors—from prejudicing the
state’s criminal processes. Both of these failings work to one end:
undermining the rights and constitutional processes necessary to protect the
guilty and the innocent in the face of state power to forfeit life or liberty.
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